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IN THE WAKE OF THE SNAIL
DARTER: AN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW PARADIGM AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
Zygmunt J.B. Plater*
Everything is connected to everything else: so goes the first
law of ecology. This interconnectedness is reflected in environ
mental law as well, extending beyond natural science and partic
ular resource conflicts to link environmental law intimately with
the politics, philosophies, economics, and societal values that
form its much larger context—an ecology of human and natural
systems.1
The Tellico Dam litigation2 reflected this interconnectedness.
On its face, it was a simple environmental confrontation; it will
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., 1965, Princeton University;
J.D., 1968, Yale University; LL.M., 1974, S.J.D., 1980, University of Michigan. The au
thor gratefully acknowledges the very capable assistance of Scott Jordan and Jon R.
Roelike, Boston College Law School Class of 1987, in preparing this Article; errors that
remain are the author's own.
1. The "environmental" label is applied to an extraordinarily diverse array of is
sues—nuclear waste, lead paint in city tenements, national parks, pollution in all its
forms, historic preservation, the Supersonic Transport (SST), occupational safety, trans
portation, seal puppies bludgeoned on Canadian ice floes. The only common thread dis
cernible in this broad range is that in each case various citizen participants denominated
"the environmentalists" intervene in ongoing "official" or market decisionmaking, seek
ing to introduce values and considerations that would otherwise be ignored: long-term
residual health effects, the value of undervalued natural or historical resources, the un
qualified values of quality of life and aesthetic considerations, indirect diseconomies
imposed on the commons, and so on. It is in this way that environmental law presents a
variety of paradigms for the analysis of modern government decisionmaking.
2. There were more than a dozen judicial decisions in the course of the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) campaign to build the Tellico Dam, including condemnation
challenges, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a
(1982 & Supp. II 1984) litigation, endangered species litigation, and Indian religious
rights cases. See United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Tracts of Land, 387 F. Supp. 319
(E.D. Tenn. 1974) (condemnation challenge), aff'd, 532 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir.), cert, denied,
429 U.S. 827 (1976); EDF v. TVA (I), 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.) (NEPA litigation),
aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); EDF v. TVA (II), 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.)
(NEPA litigation), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753
(E.D. Tenn. 1976) (endangered species litigation), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977),
aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (Indian
religious rights), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
The author was petitioner and counsel for the plaintiff citizens in the last years of the
Tellico Dam controversy, from 1973 to 1980, and represented the citizens in Department
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be remembered as the "extreme" case of the little endangered
fish, the snail darter, that almost stopped a Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) dam. But if one picks up the dangling threads
of the story and follows them, the Tellico controversy weaves a
much broader fabric. This Article chronicles the history of the
controversy as a backdrop to an analysis of lessons learned in
terms of legal doctrine, government decisionmaking, and media.
Tellico
Tellico is the story of the long-running controversy surround
ing the TVA's Tellico Dam Project. The contest represented dif
ferent things to different people. To the citizens who opposed
the dam, it represented an important opportunity to challenge
and modify a wasteful and destructive pork-barrel project. To
the proponents of the dam, it was a disturbing example of how
governmental development projects can be obstructed by outsid
ers to the system—by environmental activists, safety nuts, con
sumers, whistleblowers, and others of dubious patriotism. But to
most of the country then and now, the Tellico case was and re
mains the story of the snail darter.
As reported during the 1970's, the story consistently came
down to a simple caricature: the snail darter, a two-inch min
now, misused by extremist environmentalists at the last possible
moment to halt completion of a massive $150,000,000 hydroelec
tric dam. In fact, each element of that summary was incorrect.3
J The perceived reality, however, had an immutable force of its
/ own, then as now possessing more importance than the facts as
they existed on the record, and in that irony lies one of the im-
l portant lessons to be drawn from the case.
The Valley and Its Legal History
A brief narrative background: The valley of the Little Tennes
see River (Little T), where it flows out of the Great Smoky
Mountains, was settled more than 10,000 years ago because even
of the Interior proceedings, in Cabinet-level interagency Endangered Species Committee
proceedings, and in various proceedings before the 94th, 95th, and 96th Congresses.
3. As noted infra and in a 1983 symposium on the TVA. See Plater, Reflected in a
River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 747
(1982).
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then it was a special place.4 The river's waters ran cool, highly
oxygenated, fertile, and filled with fish. The valley lands were
rich beyond belief, high-grade topsoil to a depth of twenty feet
or more. The Cherokees became a people here over the last mil
lennium. Their most sacred places and Chota, their holy city of
refuge, were located here. The first Anglo colonists entered the
valley in the 18th century, building Fort Loudon as their south
western-most redoubt to protect them and their Cherokee allies
from the French and other Indian tribes. In the 1830's, respond
ing to the land demands of the white settlers, Andrew Jackson
drove the Cherokees off their lands in the Little T Valley in a
forced emigration, which culminated in the Trail of Tears to
Oklahoma. The white settlers immediately moved in to take
over the vacated Cherokee lands. Fort Loudon and many of
those early families were still there 200 years later when the
TVA arrived and began building dams.
The TVA first hypothesized the Tellico Dam5 in a 1936 com
pilation of all dammable sites in the Tennessee Valley system.
The Authority gave the site, located at the mouth of the Little
Tennessee River where it flows into the Big Tennessee, lowest
priority on the list of approximately seventy dam sites because
of its marginal cost justification. It remained only a hypothetical
site over the years while the TVA built hydroelectric dams and
flood control structures elsewhere throughout the river system.
All dams justifiable in terms of flood control, navigation, and
power—more than forty—had been built by 1950.6 The Author-
4. See generally J. Chapman, Tellico Archaeology: 12,000 Years of Native Ameri
can History (Publications in Anthropology No. 41, published by TVA, 1985). As early as
1894, Cyrus Thomas of the Bureau of Ethnology, a branch of the Smithsonian Institu
tion, observed, "The valley of the Little Tennessee River from where it leaves the Smoky
[MJountains which form the boundary between North Carolina and Tennessee, to where
it joins the Tennessee River in Loudon County, is undoubtedly the most interesting
archeological section in the entire Appalachian district." Endangered Species—Part 2:
Hearings on H.R. 10883 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 668 (1978) [hereinafter cited as House Endangered Species Hearings on
H.R. 10883] (exhibit taken from National Register of Historic Places).
5. "Tellico" is a name of Cherokee Indian origin, and the Tellico Dam Project was so-
named because the small Tellico River flowed into the Little Tennessee River (Little T)
at a point approximately 14 miles upstream from the dam site. Both rivers would even
tually be inundated by the dam but the TVA wisely avoided calling their project any
thing "Little." See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
6. Aubrey Wagner, Director and shortly thereafter Chairman of the TVA, stated in
September 1961 that the remaining unbuilt dams—those on the larger tributaries like
Tellico—were not economically feasible. Wagner stated, "[The] benefits [of these re
maining, unbuilt dams] are not nearly great enough alone to justify the total cost of the
projects." Public Works Appropriations, 1962: Hearings on H.R. 9076 Before the Sub
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1961). Later,
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ity continued building dams, however, stretching to justify each
on grounds such as "economic development demonstrations.,,T
By 1960, more than sixty dams had been built, and the TVA
finally turned to the few remaining sites, including Tellico. By
then what had always been a treasure had become unique. The
remnant thirty-three-mile stretch of the Little T, flowing with
all its ancient qualities of richness and clarity, was the last such
stretch of river left.8
Congress at first refused to permit the dam to be built,9 but,
faced with repeated TVA requests, in 1966 the House Appropri
ations Committee finally passed an appropriations bill providing
funds for the project.10 Its primary stated purposes were not hy
droelectric; they were (1) to provide recreation11 and (2) to pro-
during the same hearing, Wagner stated that all dams that one could "justify" had been
built, and that the other dam project proposals remaining on the original list "fall far
short" of being justifiable under the TVA Act. Id. at 81.
7. Under the direction of Aubrey Wagner, quoted supra note 6, the TVA moved into
a new era of dam building in the mid-1960's by justifying new projects in terms of recre
ational enhancement of dams and shoreline development. Underlying this new genera
tion of dams was § 22 of the TVA Act of 1933, which empowers the Authority to under
take "studies, experiments, or demonstrations" to "aid further the . . . development of
the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin." 16 U.S.C. § 831u (1982).
This provision has been used to justify a wide range of projects not directly relating to
agriculture, flood control, power, or navigation.
8. The TVA had dammed 2500 linear miles of river, creating a sequence of reservoirs
descending from the region's mountain headwaters down to the Mississippi. As a result,
Tennessee now has more shoreline than all of the Great Lakes combined. The total
shoreline of TVA reservoirs within Tennessee is now approximately 10,000 miles in sum
mer months, compared to the Great Lakes' 7870 miles. Telephone interview with TVA
Public Information Office (Sept. 3, 1982); 10 Encyclopaedia Britannica, The Great
Lakes 773, 774 (1968 ed.).
9. The TVA originally requested funding for the dam as the Fort Loudoun Extension
Dam (the TVA consistently spells Loudon with a second "u," going back to the old En
glish form of the name) in its 1941 budget, and Congress appropriated funding in 1942.
The War Materials Production Board, however, criticized the dam's cost-effectiveness
and ordered the money appropriated for it to be used elsewhere. Public Works Appro
priations, 1966—Part 4: Hearings on H.R. 9220 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1966
Senate Hearings on H.R. 9220—Part 4] (statement of Aubrey Wagner, Chairman, TVA).
The dam was again proposed in 1965 as part of the Public Works Appropriations Bill for
Fiscal Year 1966. H.R. 9220, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965). Funding for the dam was tem
porarily denied, partly as a function of local opposition to the project and in larger part
to allow the subcommittee chairman to commence funding for the Tims Ford Dam in his
district. See Public Works Appropriations for 1966—Part 3: Hearings Before a Sub
comm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-25, 144-51
(1965) [hereinafter cited as 1966 House Appropriations Hearings—Part 3].
10. Public Works Appropriations Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 89-689, 80 Stat. 1002, 1014
(1966).
11. The official benefit-cost ratio showed annualized benefits of $3.7 million with rec
reation as the major project benefit, estimated at $1,440,000. Comptroller Gen. of the
U.S., The Tennessee Valley Authority's Tellico Dam Project—Costs, Alternatives,
and Benefits 28 (1977). Earlier, as a matter of policy, the TVA had never included rec-
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mote industrial development through the sale of large blocks of
condemned farmlands.12 To support the benefit-cost justification
claims, the TVA projected extraordinary net recreation in
creases, although by this time the Little T was the last remain
ing stretch of high-quality recreational flowing river, with
twenty-four other reservoirs within a fifty-mile radius;13 and
they hypothesized extensive shoreland development based on an
industrial city to be called "Timberlake," which theoretically
would be attracted to the project area, with a series of factories
requiring hundreds of acres for industrial development.14
But more than 300 farm families then lived in the valley; hun
dreds of fishermen and canoeists loved it as the last, best re
maining stretch of clean flowing river in the region; and the val-
reational benefits in the benefit-cost analysis for TVA Projects. See Public Works Ap
propriations, 1960: Hearings on H.R. 7509 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1959). Chairman Vogel stated in a House
hearing in 1961 that recreational benefits were a byproduct and not a primary objec
tive of the TVA's reservoir construction program. Public Works Appropriations for
1962—Part 3: Hearings on H.R. 9076 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 948 (1961).
12. "Shoreland development" was the second major projected benefit, at $710,000 a
year, the majority of which was based upon sale of lands for the projected construction
of a model industrial city to be called Timberlake and built by Boeing Corporation with
federal subsidies. The TVA used these expected land profits to enhance project benefits
so as to improve the benefit-cost ratio. The TVA used this unique method of calculating
benefits to establish an affirmative benefit-cost ratio that could not be obtained using
traditional methods. See 1966 House Appropriations Hearings—Part 3, supra note 9, at
19 (cost-benefit figures); see also Public Works Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1967—Part 4: Hearings on H.R. 17787 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on
H.R. 17787—Part 4] (statement of Sen. Allen Ellender) ("[I]f [the TVA] were to use the
same yardstick [as the Army Corps of Engineers] for the Tellico and Tims Ford
[projects, then their] benefit-cost ratio would not be sufficient to warrant the Federal
Government to put up any money."). Although the TVA claimed to have used land sale
profits for the justification of previous projects, no prior use of this extraordinary tech
nique approached the scope of its use in Tellico.
13. The majority of these lie in the Tennessee Valley but there are eight dams lying
to the east in the Atlantic watershed.
14. Timberlake was named after the first British officer to map the region and was
patterned after a model Minnesota city designed by Athelstan Spilhaus that was also
never built. It was projected to require between $250 million and $800 million in subsi
dies that were not included in the Tellico cost projections. The estimates of jobs and
industrial locations were based upon the intuitive and unproved "Foster Hypothesis,"
espoused by the late Michael Foster, Director of the Division of Navigation Development
and Economic Studies, that a combination of water, rail, and highway transport routes
would generate jobs and industrial development wherever such elements occurred to
gether. See TVA, Timberlake New Community (1974) (draft environmental impact
statement). Proceeding from this hypothesis, the TVA defended its dryland condemna
tions by predicting that the industries likely to come to Timberlake would need large,
undivided tracts that the TVA wanted to be certain would be available when needed for
industrial development. 1966 House Appropriations Hearings—Part 3, supra note 9, at
22 (testimony of Aubrey Wagner, Chairman, TVA).
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ley of the Little T was sacred to the Cherokees, whose most
revered places would be destroyed by a reservoir. Thus, a rough
citizen coalition, "The Association for the Preservation of the
Little Tennessee River," was formed in 1964, and attempted to
resist the project in Congress and through local political opposi
tion.16 Faced with a solid linkage between the TVA, the pork-
barrel congressional committees, local politicians, and land spec
ulators, however, the citizens had no realistic chance, legally or
on the merits, to stop the project during the 1960's.16 The dam
structure was built in 1968, a concrete wall standing over one
channel of the Little Tennessee River, costing somewhat less
than five million dollars.17 The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA),18 however, gave the citizens a new lease on
life, and they filed suits to stop the project.19
15. The Association for the Preservation of the Little Tennessee River was the most
formalized attempt to create an umbrella organization for the citizens opposed to the
dam. Its existence as an organized entity was important in keeping hope and active ef
forts alive and focused during the first dozen years of the fight. At various times its role
was picked up and carried on by the Fort Loudon Association, the Tennessee Endan
gered Species Committee, the Tellico Landowners Association, and finally the Little
Tennessee River Alliance. The groups raised funds through church meetings, potluck
dinners, sales of T-shirts and donated art work, and donations. They never were solvent
for long, nor did they have reliable media access. No national conservation organization
acted as a financial or organizational "angel," although the Environmental Defense Fund
took over the litigation burden for an important two years in the early 1970's, National
Trout Unlimited helped raise an important portion of the post-1977 litigation costs, and
other groups donated office space, political legwork, and moral support in the final politi
cal battles.
16. Citizen opposition consisted of attempts to dissuade the House and Senate Ap
propriations Committees from authorizing funds for the dam. See, e.g., 1966 Senate
Hearings on H.R. 9220—Part 4, supra note 9, at 202-44; Senate Hearings on H.R.
17787—Part 4, supra note 12, at 62-80. Success, however, was unlikely given the momen
tum of the pork-barrel appropriations process and the political bloc represented by the
TVA. Furthermore, no statutes existed that could be the basis of an injunction action
and the only legal challenges available to the citizens were defenses to the exercise of
eminent domain and blanket assertions of "arbitrariness." The former was attempted
and failed, and the latter was so weak an argument that it was never the basis of a
challenge. But see infra note 148 and accompanying text.
There were several challenges to the TVA's condemnation of land for the dam project
during the late 1960's and early 1970's. Most of these challenges were summarily dis
posed of by the Tennessee Eastern District federal court in unreported decisions that
were not appealed. But see United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Tracts of Land, 532 F.2d
1083 (6th Cir.) (eminent domain), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
17. Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., supra note 11, at 7. The total cost of the dam
structure proper was $4.08 million when the endangered species violation was discovered,
and rose to slightly more than $6 million. The valley was so shallow that it had to be
built up along the sides at several points to hold a reservoir. The associated earthworks
raised the dam-related construction costs to approximately $22.5 million. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
19. EDF v. TVA (I), 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir.
1972). This appears to be the only decision in which the federal court of the Eastern
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Litigation under NEPA produced an injunction, which held
for two years but ultimately was dissolved in 1973 when the Au
thority produced an adequate statement of the project's destruc
tive consequences.20 In the same year, however, Dr. David
Etnier, a University of Tennessee ichthyologist, discovered a
small endangered perch living in the midst of the Tellico project
area,21 and a new round of litigation began. Section 7 of the 1973
federal Endangered Species Act prohibited federal agencies from
taking any action that jeopardized the existence of an endan
gered species or modified a critical habitat.22 The Tellico project
would do both. The fish was endangered and required the clean
flowing river habitat that the dam would destroy. Armed with
this clear statutory violation, the dam's citizen opponents
formed an ad hoc litigation group, filed administrative petitions
in 1974 under the terms of the Endangered Species Act, and be
gan court proceedings in 1975.23 The TVA resisted the statute's
application in every way possible, while the citizens fought hard
to push the case forward, both clearly sensing that this issue was
the only available legal "handle" with which the dam project as
District of Tennessee has enforced environmental values under federal law against the
TVA. Harvey Broome, a retired attorney and founder of the Wilderness Society, was the
judge's clerk at the time and appears to have been able to influence the outcome of the
case.
20. EDF v. TVA (II), 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.
1974). NEPA, though it may have focused a great deal of federal agency attention on
avoiding environmental litigation, has two major flaws. One is that the Act has become
basically procedural. If an agency sufficiently catalogues the bad environmental conse
quences it will cause, it may go ahead and do them. Second, NEPA depends upon a
court's willingness to push an agency into compliance. Its terms are sufficiently general
ized to allow a deferential court to accept agency self-justifications as within the domain
of agency discretion so long as the exercise of such discretion is not arbitrary and capri
cious, a finding that is as rare as it is difficult to establish.
21. Dr. Etnier was swimming along with a snorkel and facemask, making a final cen
sus of the river as the dam project got back underway. He caught the fish with his fin
gers, surfaced, and exclaimed to an onlooker that he had discovered a previously un
known species of river darter. The Tellico project thus encountered yet another obstacle
and was destined to become a subject of national attention as a new round of litigation
focused on the endangered little fish.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982). This section, denominated "Interagency coopera
tion," contains within its turgid text the barebones of two causes of action: "Each Fed
eral agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency ... is not likely to [(1)] jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or [(2)] result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species . . . ." Id.
23. Before filing a lawsuit, the plaintiffs had to get the fish listed as an endangered
species, a biopolitical process that involved numerous difficulties but culminated in a
listing effective November 10, 1975. See 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505, 47,505-06 (1975) (current
list codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1985)). The TVA indicated that it would not alter its
plans for the completion of Tellico, and suit was filed in February 1976 in Tennessee's
Eastern District federal court.
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a whole could be challenged. The use of the snail darter, the
citizens hoped, was not a cynical fortuity. Ag they repeatedly
tried to tell th&^media, not to mention the_SupTOn^
precarious existence of the endangered fish in the Little T con
stituted a barometer of endangered humajTvalues in thisTa*st
TemsMv^^rel^of high quality river? The snail darter Tn the
LitffiTT was a^canary in ajgoaLminel!!24
The trial courTjudge found that the dam would destroy the
canary but declined to issue an injunction.25 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals26 corrected the trial judge's omission, and the
Supreme Court of the United States subsequently affirmed the
injunction.27 The case by no means ended with the Supreme
Court decision, however, given the cantankerousness of the con
tending parties. After the Sixth Circuit decision, the media had
fixed upon its "fish bites dam" characterization^£ the rasp Con-
gress respondecTwith three series of hearings in the relevant sub
stantive committees, "htft the Appropriations Committees, con
sidering whether this extreme application of the law should be
reversed.28 Three times the committee members were convinced,
much to their surprise, that the case for the river was not an
example of environmental irrationality, and no amendments
were passed. Finally, at Howard Baker's insistence, the contro
versy was transferred to a specially created "Endangered Species
Committee."29 Under the terms of Baker's legislation, this "God
\j
24. Miners used to carry canaries into mines as an early warning indicator of dangers
to humans from methane gas. If the canary died, the miners were alerted that their own
lives were in danger. According to biologists, the darter used to live throughout the Ten
nessee River Valley, implicitly indicating that the darter's prior range had been de
stroyed by the succession of dams on the Tennessee River system. See Public Works for
Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1978—Part 4:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 240-41 (1977) (statement of TVA witness); Endangered Species Act Oversight:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Envi
ronment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 291 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Endangered Species Act Oversight Hearings].
25. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
26. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
27. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
28. House Endangered Species Hearings on H.R. 10883, supra note 4 (House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm.); Senate Endangered Species Act Oversight
Hearings, supra note 24 (Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works); To Amend
the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 2334, S. 3122, and H.R. 8092 Before
the Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Commerce Comm. Hearings],
29. The Committee is composed of seven members: the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Adminis
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of the Interior, the Admin
istrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and one presidentially
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Committee," as the Endangered Species Committee came to be
called, was given the power to review Tellico and other endan
gered species conflicts to determine whether an exemption
should issue allowing a species to be extirpated because of press
ing human needs.30 The "God Committee," however, unani
mously decided that, even with the project close to completion,
developing the Valley without a reservoir would be more eco
nomically and environmentally sound.31 The media, however^
hardly covered this part of the story, for the fish's ^acticaTrole
was noFso riveting as the reiqninp cgicStOTOrTriewlmonths
later, the^pork-barrel proponents, in forty-two seconds, in ajn
empty House chamber, were able to slip a rider onto an appro
priations bill, repealing all protective laws as they applied to
Tellico and ordering the reservoir's completion.32 Despite a half-
appointed representative for each of the states affected by the project in question. 16
U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3) (1982). The Tellico and Greyrocks Dams (the latter involving a criti
cal breeding area for the endangered whooping crane) were the first and only subjects to
date of the Committee's review procedure.
30. Id. § 1536(e)(2).
31. The Committee developed its own analysis of remaining project alternatives, us
ing extensive citizen input and a report produced by the TVA in cooperation with the
Department of the Interior that had analyzed three development options besides the
reservoir, including the citizens' river development plan. TVA, Alternatives for Complet
ing the Tellico Project (Dec. 1978); Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
Tellico Dam and Reservoir (Jan. 19, 1979) (Staff Report to the Endangered Species
Committee). Based on the staff analysis, Charles Schultze, then Chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisors and a member of the Committee, pointedly noted that even with
95% of the money spent, the benefits of Tellico did not justify spending the last 5%,
"which says something about the original design." U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Endangered
Species Committee Hearing 26 (Jan. 23, 1979) (unpublished transcript of public hearing,
available at Tellico Archives, Boston College Law School). Committee Chairman Cecil
Andrus said, "I hate to see the snail darter get the credit for stopping a project that was
ill-conceived and uneconomic in the first place." Hornblower, Panel Junks TVA Dam;
Cites Cost, Not Snail Darter, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1979, at A12, col. 5.
32. See Plater, Those Who Care About Laws or Sausages Shouldn't Watch Them
Being Made, L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 1979, § V, at 5, col. 1, reprinted in Energy and Water
Development Appropriations for 1982—Part 9: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 314-16 (1981). The maneuver
violated Rule XXI, cl. 2 of the Rules of the House of Representatives which, evidently
responding to the dangers inherent in allowing appropriations bills to amend substantive
laws, provides: "Nor shall any provision in any [appropriation] bill or amendment
thereto changing existing law be in order . . . ." H.R. Doc. No. 403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
525 (1979). The rider did nothing else but amend existing laws, but in order to enforce
compliance with Rule XXI, a timely point of order had to be made. The House Appro
priations Committee engineered its move so that none of the few representatives present
would understand what was being done, so no point of order was made. More complete
statements of the amendment's content were inserted in the Congressional Record, but
none were actually made on the floor when the rider was being considered. Only the first
17 words of the amendment (up to "authorized") were actually made on the floor. Of
course, no references were made to "Tellico," "Little Tennessee River," "endangered
species," "snail darter," or any other phrase that would have given their fellow members
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hearted veto threat by President Carter33 and a last-minute con
stitutionally-based lawsuit brought by the Cherokee Indians,34
the TVA was ultimately able to finish the dam, close the gates,
and flood the valley on November 28, 1979.
This skeletal sketch of the legal proceedings does little to indi
cate the Tellico controversy's full drama and merits. The snail
darter endangered species issue was indeed only a handle,
though a philosophically important one. The merits of the en
dangered species case quickly raised ultimate questions about
the dam's merits. Environmental controversies may only coinci-
dentally resemble the particular legal issues upon which they
proceed. "™ '~~ ~™ ~ "
Beyond the Legal Arguments: Tellico's "Environmental" Case
In the case of the Tellico Dam, the project's environmental
opponents had determined early that they would have to do
more than merely oppose the dam and reservoir. Instead, as so
notice of the amendment's content. Most students of American government do not know
that the Congressional Record is not a complete record of congressional debates, and
thus is not properly cited as an official record. See U.S. Const, art. 1, § 5, cl. 3 (journal of
each chamber as bare bones statement of its proceedings); Bleisch, The Congressional
Record and the First Amendment: Accuracy Is the Best Policy, 12 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.
Rev. 341 (1985).
33. Carter's position with regard to the Tellico controversy exemplified the difficul
ties he experienced with his conciliatory and diplomatic approach to the presidency.
Publicly, Carter stated that he was "convinced that this resolution of the Tellico matter
[would] help assure the passage of the Endangered Species Act reauthorization" and
that his cooperation in refusing to veto the bill would stimulate congressional support for
benefit-cost control legislation that would allow the Water Resources Council to review
the economic feasibility of water projects. Statement on Signing H.R. 4388 into Law,
1979 Pub. Papers 1760 (Sept. 25, 1979).
Although the House Appropriations Committee had already disappointed the Presi
dent by striking most of the water resources benefit-cost control provisions, Carter ap
parently believed that his yielding on the Tellico issue would dissuade the Appropria
tions Subcommittee chairman from embarrassing the President by repeating the refusal
to fund the review function. Carter thus opted against asserting his presidential preroga
tives in favor of an attempt to gain congressional support through an approach that can
perhaps best be characterized as one of hopeful appeasement.
Similarly, Carter's refusal to veto should also be considered in light of his political
battles with Congress over the Salt II Treaty and Panama Canal legislation. Politically,
the President thought he could ill-afford a tough stance on behalf of a two-and-a-half-
inch fish when he needed congressional support on other issues for which he was simi
larly reluctant to assert effectively the prerogatives of the Executive Office.
34. The citizens' coalition was able to put together a challenge based on the Ameri
can Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982), which recognizes preexisting
constitutional rights that are violated by federal projects that destroy sacred lands, in
cluding Indian burial grounds. Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979),
aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
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often occurs in environmental cases, to have a realistic chance of
prevailing in the long run, they had to base their position on a
comprehensive implicit benefit-cost-alternatives accounting.
Sound economic analysis, including analysis of constructive al-
ternatives, is part of any environmental controversy's optimum
strategy.30 Un one hand, the Tellico citizens groujTreviewed the
purported benefits of the reservoir—recreation, industrial devel
opment on condemned lands, and various vestigial benefits in
water supply, flood control, and hydroelectric capacity—and
found them on the objective record to be quite insubstantial.
Viewed in businesslike terms, the dam project was an economic
basket case.36 They then looked at the purported costs of the
project, arguing that the true costs extended beyond the Author
ity's costs for cement, fill dirt, land condemnation, and roads
and bridges. Ajrgalistic accounting of the true social costs would
have to include the loss of all the special qualities ofJhejjyer
vallgy that had made it, a, treasure over th<icenturies. The river
was a major recreational resource on its own terms, even before
it had been rendered a virtually unique resource by the im
poundment of 2500 linear miles of river in the surrounding re
gion. The agricultural soils of the valley were of great economic
value, the historic resources held great public value in their own
right and could be capitalized monetarily in a tourist-based de
velopment if the valley's central portion was not flooded, and a
major parcel of upriver project lands had particular potential for
use as an access and overflow management area for the Great
Smoky Mountains National Park.37 The citizens' benefit-cost ac-
35. Environmental cases generally raise this type of conceptual benefit-cost-alterna
tives analysis, which attempts to achieve an accounting of costs typically ignored by cor
porate or governmental decisionmakers. The analysis highlights nonmarket and economi
cally nonquantifiable social and ecological values and attempts to incorporate them into
decisional systems. This process, almost by definition, goes against the flow of the status
quo in the business and governmental marketplace but is nonetheless a fundamental
premise of rational public decisionmaking. See supra note 1.
36. See supra note 31.
37. The citizens' proposals for alternative development were embodied in a study
prepared by the University of Tennessee School of Architecture and by the God Com
mittee staff. School of Architecture, University of Tenn., Study of Alternative Fu
tures for the Little Tennessee River Valley (1977); see also Office of Policy Analysis,
supra note 31. The National Park Service also recommended the river development al
ternative over the reservoir plan as being better suited for easing the park's crowding
and traffic flow problems. Senate Endangered Species Act Oversight Hearings, supra
note 24, at 203-05 (testimony of Park Superintendent Boyd Evison). Surprisingly, in
spite of the citizens' continued arguments and the economics of the situation, neither the
TVA nor God Committee official reports considered what was the most profitable ele
ment of the river development option—tourism. Archeological treasures, historical sites,
and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park offered a unique opportunity for a tour
ist industry to flourish along the existing river.
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counting thus included extensive consideration of development
alternatives. With increasing sophistication over the years they
argued for a comprehensive river-based development project, al
lowing displaced families to go back onto most of the rich agri
cultural lands of the valley, developing a tourist highway
through the valley to the Park, developing recreation to promote
canoe float trips and other water-based sports, improving access
to the superb trout fishing resource, and providing for two in
dustrial parks along the river at locations where they would not
disturb the other qualities of the valley. The citizens' analysis of
the project consistently proved more accurate than the TVA's
projections in every expert review that took place during the
course of the controversy.38
The Valley, Six Years After the River
Since the river was flooded out in 1979, the citizens' predic
tions, Cassandralike, have largely been fulfilled. The snail darter
has been eliminated from its last major habitat, although a few
scattered small populations have been discovered downstream in
feeder streams, and the species is likely to survive.39 No new in
dustry has come to the Little T area because of the reservoir.40
No significant barge freight has moved there in six years.41 The
38. The series of economic reviews that took place during the controversy—the Gen
eral Accounting Office Tellico Project Report, the God Committee Staff Report, and an
analysis completed by the Conservation Foundation and the Resources for the Future
economics institute—all revealed the project to be less profitable in comparison with the
river development option. Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., supra note 11; Office of Policy
Analysis, supra note 31; The Conservation Found., Comments on the Draft Report "Al
ternatives for Completing the Tellico Project" by Tennessee Valley Authority and De
partment of Interior (Aug. 10, 1978).
39. On August 6, 1984, the Department of the Interior officially downlisted the snail
darter from an endangered to a threatened species. 49 Fed. Reg. 27,510 (1984) (codified
at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1985)).
40. Five small industrial shops have moved into the valley area slated for industrial
development under both the TVA's plans and the citizens' river-based alternative. Only
one of these shops has any water use, an outboard boat builder that uses the impound
ment for product testing—a use that was also perfectly feasible with river-based develop
ment. In justifying the reservoir, dam boosters claim any development as a success. A
more rational accounting requires proof that such development would not have come to
the area without the reservoir.
41. This can primarily be attributed to the fact that no industry that would utilize
barge freight services has chosen to locate at Tellico. See supra note 40. Furthermore,
the feasibility of any significant modern barge traffic is predicated on rebuilding—at a
prohibitively high cost—the antiquated locks system at Fort Loudon Dam. Nonetheless,
the Tellico Reservoir Development Agency (TRDA), see infra note 42, has recently fi-
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TVA has scrapped the Timberlake City chimera and given away
major sectors of project land to a "development agency" headed
by local politicians.42 Faced with a serious lack of development
interest, their first development proposal was to use valley lands
for a toxic waste dump.43 The development agency then sold
4500 acres to a resort second-home development scheme and got
five small businesses to come to the Tellico industrial park.44
What little development has occurred, in other words, given the
assets of the valley and TVA subsidies, could have been just as
well or better accommodated with a flowing river. The reservoir
represents a development debacle and a tragic loss, more tragic
because it need not have happened.
In short, even in this purportedly extreme case, the classic as
sertion oTIl basic conflict between environment and economics
was utterly wrong. Throughout the Tellico controversy it was
the "environmentalists" who were marching under the banner of
economic integrity, cost accounting, and rational decisionmak
ing; it was the dam proponents who constantly avoided reviews
of the merits of the project and sought to characterize the con
troversy as just "the little fish versus the dam."
Ultimately, the Tellico Dam was opposed by economic fact
and common sense rationality, as well as by the law, the courts,
and the judgment of the extraordinary Endangered Species
Committee. It was an unusually vivid environmental case. It not
only represented unquantifiable, intangible values of natural
ness—the traditional environmental concerns which, of course,
nanced the construction of a barge terminal in the hopes of attracting industries that
could utilize barge freight services and to facilitate barge traffic on what is, in reality, a
rural dead end at the extremity of a twisting 600-mile transport route. Telephone inter
view with TRDA Executive Office (Jan. 30, 1986).
42. From the beginning, one of the major forces in favor of the dam appears to have
been the prospect that local leaders would be able to exercise some influence and control
over any development, industrial or otherwise, that would purportedly accompany the
reservoir. After failing to lure industry to the reservoir, the TVA funneled $2.3 million of
project money to the TRDA, whose membership is comprised of local leaders and busi
nessmen. Shortly after the TRDA was formed in 1982, the TVA transferred 11,000 acres
of Tellico shoreline to the Agency with a promise that it be paid $13.8 million when the
land was resold by the Agency. See Land Sale Prompts Another Pang at Tellico Dam,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1982, at 27 (late city final ed.).
43. See letter from Charles Dean, TVA Chairman, to Lamar Alexander, Governor of
Tennessee (May 20, 1982) (available at Tellico Archives, Boston College Law School); see
also Waste Dump at Tellico Possible, Knoxville News-Sentinel, Sept. 29, 1982, at Al,
col. 1 (final home ed.).
44. Cooper Communities, Inc., a private development corporation from Arkansas, ac
quired 4592 acres of Tellico project shoreland for a stated $4,956,000 in a partial cash
purchase. None of the businesses in the industrial park requires the presence of a
reservoir.
*•
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the river incorporated aplenty with its endangered species, its
historic and religious importance to the Cherokees and
others—but also presented a rare case that could be economi
cally quantified as well, showing a decisive economic advantage
for the environmentally sound alternative.
Despite the array of facts, reason, and law against the dam,
the pork-barrel adherents of the dam were ultimately able to
prevail. This leaves us with some sobering observations, but also
with some useful lessons to be drawn from the controversy from
the hindsight of several years.
An Accounting in Three Parts
This Article offers an updated accounting of the Tellico litiga
tion's consequences in three separate areas. Part I examines en
dangered species doctrine, a subtle and important issue of con
servation, balancing philosophical, utilitarian, and economic
concerns. The threat of extinction as a discrete consideration in
government decisionmaking got its toughest public test in Tel
lico, a test that could have created a backlash undercutting the
endangered species protection program itself. This Article ar
gues, however, that the snail darter has probably strengthened
the legal protections for its endangered colleagues.
Part II traces Tellico's legal consequences in terms of judicial
doctrine. Quite independent of the environmental character of
the case, the major legal issues of Tellico lie in the areas of stat
utory interpretation and equitable discretion—the "retroactive"
applicability of statutes, the effect of appropriations bills on
substantive legislation, and the intriguing question of whether a
court in equity has the power to permit a statutory violation to
continue.
Part III is the broadest—an overall accounting of how our na
tion makes important public decisions as reflected in this one
river's story. Tellico reveals some of the best and worst of our
hesitantly pluralistic democracy, the cautious responsiveness of
courts, the volatility of legislatures, the mixed mandate of agen
cies, the crude decisive power of media, and ultimately the char
acter of the population to which the preceding institutions
respond.
Much was lost when the Little Tennessee River, having flowed
for 200 million years, was extinguished. It is important to recog
nize some positive lessons as well.
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I. Institutionalized Caution—A Legal System Dealing
with the Intangible Cost of Extinction
One of the fundamental ironies of the Tellico controversy is
that the endangered fish itself for a time seemed to threaten the
continued existence of the Endangered Species Act. The Act,
however, now seems to have survived the strains posed by the
little perch and continues its precedent-setting work in wildlife
conservation.
A. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act of 197346 is a revolutionary legal
document. It was the first major piece of legislation in any legal
system that sought to put teeth into the protection of endan
gered species domestically and internationally, and has been a
model for subsequent wildlife conservation efforts throughout
the world.46 The Act has a triple approach to the problem of
conserving species threatened with extinction.
First, it provides a partial answer to the threats posed by the
worldwide market in endangered wildlife by closing down the
United States market. The free market fails to protect endan
gered species that have market value, such as leopards, turtles,
rare birds for feathers, elephants for ivory, cactuses, and the
like. Indeed, the market encourages the complete destruction of
any endangered species that has market value by raising the
value of each animal as it approaches extinction. As the market
price per skin skyrockets, exploitation of the endangered species
becomes almost impossible to stop. Either the underdeveloped
countries of origin cannot afford to halt the lucrative trade, or
high prices create poaching pressures that can subvert any local
enforcement efforts.47 The only way to prevent the elimination
45. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. II1984). For a more complete discussion of
the history, provisions, and implementation of the Act, see M. Bean, The Evolution of
National Wildlife Law 318-83 (rev. & expanded ed. 1983); S. Yaffee, Prohibitive Pol
icy: Implementing the Federal Endangered Species Act (1982).
46. The Endangered Species Act was the first national endangered species statute to
implement strong provisions covering commercial trade restrictions, prohibitions on pub
lic agency actions, and private actions jeopardizing endangered species. See generally M.
Bean, supra note 45.
47. While working in Ethiopia from 1968 to 1971 as a consultant to the Imperial
Wildlife Conservation Organization, the author was bemused to discover a major poach
ing ring that was immune from prosecution because its lucrative profits were shared by
the brother of the author's boss. The problems of enforcing wildlife protection in devel-
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of the species is by shutting down the market in developed coun
tries.48 The United States was a major market for such endan
gered species. To the extent that it has closed down that market,
the Endangered Species Act has eliminated the pressures on ani
mals hunted to provide fur coats and other luxuries for the
American fashion world's cosmopolitan tastes.
The Act's second strategy is a prohibition against "taking"
any endangered species, a prohibition that attaches heavy crimi
nal sanctions to the act of killing or capturing endangered ani
mals.49 The taking provision, which generally does not apply to
plants, was further strengthened by a definition that interprets
"take" to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct."50 As a result, protection is extended not only to exotic
species but to all endangered and threatened species within the
jurisdiction of the United States.51
The third, less-heralded strategy of the Act lay latent within
the statute's terms, and was the basis of the snail darter litiga
tion. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act is certainly not
identified as a "prevention of destructive federal projects" provi
sion. Labelled "Interagency cooperation," section 7 lay camou
flaged like a snake in the grass to the major developmental in
terests that would subsequently have to face it. When parsed
carefully, however, its words prohibit any federal agency project
or program that jeopardizes the continued existence of a species,
or destroys or modifies that species' critical habitat.52 This pro-
oping countries facing massive human dislocations and starvation raise interesting ques
tions of cultural relativity. See P. Ehrlich & A. Ehrlich, Extinction: The Causes and
Consequences of the Disappearance of Species 245-48 (1981).
48. The Endangered Species Act forbids any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States to "sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any [endan
gered] species." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(F) (1982).
49. The Act's taking prohibition is found in id. § 1538(a)(1)(C), and the criminal
sanctions for violation of the Act are found in § 1540(b).
50. Id. § 1532(19);see 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1985) (further defining "harass" and "harm"
with respect to the statutory definition of "take").
51. The Act applies to all territorial possessions of the United States, all of the conti
nental United States, and Hawaii and Alaska. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(17) (1982). The Act's
application to federal agencies operating overseas has yet to be litigated. For example, it
is not clear whether the Act applies to a dam that threatens to modify the critical
habitat of endangered elephants in Sri Lanka when the dam is built by the Department
of State's Agency for International Development (AID).
The Act also permits the Secretary of the Interior to extend the Act's protections to
species that closely resemble endangered species. Id. § 1533(e). This provision relieves
enforcement personnel of the burden of distinguishing a bona fide endangered species
from a closely related but nonendangered species and thus further ensures the protection
of the former.
52. See supra note 22.
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vision focuses on federal agencies as major actors in the develop
mental forces of the United States. Over the past fifty years, a
parade of federal agencies has been involved in large scale public
works pork-barrel projects, many built at the expense of, and
without much concern for, natural values, and other projects and
programs affecting natural resources.
The strategic resemblance between the Endangered Species
Act and NEPA is remarkable. Both statutes possess effective
widespread strength because they target the actions of federal
agencies. Both statutes contain action provisions that came as a
surprise to most of the members of Congress who voted for
them.63 Section 7, however, has a special strength: NEPA only
requires procedural compliance;54 section 7 contains a flat sub
stantive prohibition.
Another strength of section 7 is that it targets one of the ma
jor causes of the extinction of species on the face of the earth:
habitat destruction.55 Over the years, habitat destruction has
been a far more important cause of extinction than hunting and
killing because the largest number of endangered species are
"nonmarket species," those that currently lack quantifiable mar
ket value. Rather, they are the often anonymous constituent
parts of various food chains and ecological webs that are dis
rupted when a desert becomes developed for irrigated farms, a
prairie is destroyed for residential development or agribusiness,
a swamp is drained to produce a parking lot, and so forth. Sec
tion 7's prohibitions were the first statutory prohibitions to ad
dress clearly the problem of habitat destruction, albeit in cam
ouflaged fashion.
53. NEPA's § 102(C) requirement of environmental impact statements, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(C) (1982), was clearly considered by its legislators to be a mere declaration of
policy with no effective enforceability. See R. Andrews, Environmental Policy and Ad
ministrative Change 13-16 (1976). See generally id. at 7-19 (presenting a legislative his
tory of NEPA). See supra note 22, infra note 126.
54. The United States Supreme Court has noted that although NEPA established
"significant substantive goals for the Nation," its actual requirements for agencies are
"essentially procedural." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
55. Habitat destruction today is "without peer as an agent of extinction" and "there
has never been as wanton nor as rapid an agent of habitat destruction as twentieth-
century man." 0. Frankel & M. Soule, Conservation and Evolution 29-30 (1981).
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B. Rationales for Endangered Species Protection
Given the Endangered Species Act's strengths, both patent
and latent, it might well be asked why a nation might consider it
sufficiently important to pass such a statute in an abstract area
of natural science. The question is made all the more pointed by
the fact that protection of endangered species inevitably causes
a head-on confrontation with the forces of the marketplace. The
effort to prohibit the sale of valuable endangered species con
fronts a worldwide trade involving large amounts of money.56
Moreover, an endangered species lacking market value, ignored
as an asset by the marketplace, may nevertheless interfere with
government and private development projects especially when
they involve habitat destruction.
It is easiest to say that the Endangered Species Act of 1973
was passed to satisfy a popular clamor, beginning in the 1960's,
to conserve natural resources. Endangered species had the good
fortune to be represented by such mediagenic figures as the bald
eagle, the polar bear, whales, and whooping cranes, all of which
were sentimentally appealing, fairly remote from market consid
erations affecting most people, and dramatic or beautiful. Fur
ther, there were international conventions ratified by the United
States,57 which in broad, hortatory terms expressed an interna
tional intention to conserve such species and all endangered and
threatened wildlife. Part of the impetus came from the well-or
ganized, nationally-based conservation groups that have long
made the United States a leader in international conservation.58
But political pressure and aesthetics alone do not represent a
56. See P. Ehrlich & A. Ehrlich, supra note 47, at 119-26, 193-98. In Kenya, for
example, government officials were found to be actively involved in the lucrative export
trade of ivory, which had a devastating effect on Kenya's elephant population. Id. at 194-
95; Tinker, Controlling the Global Wildlife Trade, Atlas World Press Rev., July 1979,
at 26, 27; see also supra note 47.
57. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natu
ral Heritage, done Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151;
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
58. Discreetly listed here in alphabetical order, the following groups have been effec
tive in encouraging the formation of national species preservation policy: American Riv
ers Conservation Council, Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund, Friends
of the Earth, Izaak Walton League, National Audubon Society, National Parks and Con
servation Association, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Sierra Club, Society for Animal Protective Legislation, Trout Unlimited, Wildlife Man
agement Institute, and the World Wildlife Fund. These groups are unique among those
found in industrialized nations in terms of overall membership size and lobbying
effectiveness.
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sufficient explanation for why the Endangered Species Act of
1973 became domestic law. The argument for protection for en
dangered species represented not only protection of the aes
thetic beauties of certain species, but also ecological and philo
sophical principles asserting the value of the survival of the
widest possible number of species, in the context of a continuing
loss each year of hundreds of species worldwide.59 The utilitar
ian position holds that preserving endangered species is in some
way directly or indirectly important for the continued survival
of human beings. An endangered species may possess chemical
or medical properties that will never be discovered if the crea
tures are rendered extinct. We preserve species because of les
sons they may teach us in the future; at some point, "they may
reveal a cure for cancer."60 Another argument is that the more
diversity that exists in the natural world, the more adaptable
that world is to continuing stresses.61 This argument reflects a
fundamental law of ecology that the more diverse a gene pool or
ecosystem, the greater the natural bank of adaptive diversity
upon which society can draw.62
Unfortunately, as repeatedly demonstrated in subsequent
59. See generally The Preservation of Species (B. Norton ed. 1985) (a collection of
essays by, among others, Stephen Kellert, Thomas Lovejoy, and Elliott Sober). Harvard
Professor E.O. Wilson has projected that by the late 1980's, the globe's extinction rate
could reach one species per hour. Habitat Protection: The Lifeline for Endangered Spe
cies, In Brief, Aug. 1985, at 1, 3 (newsletter of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund).
60. "Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and maketh us wiser than
the fowls of heaven?" Job 35:11. The arguments implicit in this Biblical quote can be
seen in the various Endangered Species Act Oversight Hearings and original passage
hearings in Congress and represent a utilitarian principle that probably offered the most
effective arguments to the pragmatic minds of the legislators. See, e.g., Senate Endan
gered Species Act Oversight Hearings, supra note 24. As stated by Dr. Thomas E.
Lovejoy of the World Wildlife Fund, "[M]an-caused extinctions are limiting the poten
tial growth of knowledge and constitute a form of bookburning of a very frightening
sort—burning of books that have yet to be written. . . . Should we throw away the
owner's manual to our car before we even know the names of all the parts?" Id. at 537.
61. As stated by Senator Tunney in the Congressional Record, "Each species pro
vides a service to its environment [and] is a part of an immensely complicated ecological
organization, the stability of which rests on the health of its components." 119 Cong.
Rec. 25,668 (1973); see also infra note 62.
62. As a general proposition there appears to be a direct relationship between diver
sity and ecosystem stability. S. Yaffee, supra note 45, at 24. As stated by Paul and Anne
Ehrlich:
[L]oss of genetic variability from any sexually reproducing populations will limit
their ability, and that of the ecosystem, to evolve in response to environmental
change. Such losses are especially critical in times of rapid change, which stress
the evolutionary capacity of an ecosystem to the utmost. Today is just such a
time of change—change induced by one species: Homo sapiens.
P. Ehrlich & A. Ehrlich, supra note 47, at 100.
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hearings,63 it is very difficult to show the particular utility of
many species, especially species previously unknown that hap
pen to confront a particular, valuable, market development proj
ect.64 Therefore, beyond the strict utility argument often ap
pears a variety of quasi-religious principles emphasizing the
sanctity of life. This latter philosophical principle was the most
difficult to articulate amidst congressional hearings or agency
proceedings but reflected an important thread that runs through
the endangered species cases—humans are stewards of their nat
ural environment and ultimately are only constituent members
of the community of life of the globe.66 This theory sounds Tao-
ist, and often appears to conflict with a Judeo-Christian concept
of human conquest and subjugation of nature.66 The Endan-
63. Congressional hearings on the Endangered Species Act in 1976, 1977, and 1978
included: House Endangered Species Hearings on H.R. 10883—Parts 1 and 2, supra
note 4; Amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 2899 Before the
Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Senate Endangered Species Act Oversight Hearings,
supra note 24; Senate Commerce Comm. Hearings, supra note 28.
64. In the subcommittee hearings on Tellico, for example, congressional attention fo
cused only on the "bottom line"—the purported economic costs and benefits of flooding
the Valley or saving the snail darter. General discussion of the abstract values of species
preservation did not make much of a political impression on the Solons. The snail darter,
however, had the benefit of representing, at least symbolically, the economic values at
tributed to the river-based alternatives. See supra notes 31 & 37. One agricultural ana
lyst testified that the snail darter was "worth a $37 million a year industry." House En
dangered Species Hearings on H.R. 10883, supra note 4, at 653 (statement of Daniel
Burgner). Other species in other situations, however, do not have the benefit of repre
senting economically preferable development alternatives.
65. Aldo Leopold's articulation of a "land ethic" has been a useful starting point for
attempts to inject ecological ethical considerations into the land-use decisionmaking pro
cess. A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac 237-63 (1966). In Leopold's view, land-use
problems cannot be viewed solely in economic terms. As explained in Senate hearings on
the Endangered Species Act, his view was that each question must be examined "in
terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedi
ent. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." Senate Endangered Species Act
Oversight Hearings, supra note 24, at 626 (testimony of Dr. Michael Zagata, Representa
tive, National Audubon Society).
66. Contrary to Eastern religious thought, the Judeo-Christian tradition teaches that
God has given humanity dominion over God's creatures. In the Book of Genesis, after
the Great Flood,
God blessed Noah and his sons, saying to them, "Be fruitful, multiply and fill
the earth.
Be the terror and dread of all the wild beasts and all the birds of heaven, of
everything that crawls on the ground and all the fish of the sea; they are handed
over to you.
Teem over the earth and be lord of it."
Genesis 9:1-2, 7.
This ethos has often led to a religious-political emphasis of human conquest, exploita
tion, and superiority over nature and is the basis for an unspoken but pervasive notion
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gered Species Act, which made no distinction between commer
cially valuable and non-commercially valuable species, between
species that had a direct human utility and those that did not,
affirmed a variety of abstract interests in protecting species be
cause they were endangered.67 The statute gave legal value to an
abstraction. The survival of species, insofar as possible, was de
clared a valid national goal.
C. The Effect of the Snail Darter on the Endangered
Species Act
The endangered snail darter threatened the entire proposition
by seemingly demeaning the case for protection of endangered
species. The little fish had raised up a host of antagonists rang
ing far beyond the TVA. Some were those who foresaw direct
conflicts between endangered species and their own interests.
These opponents of the snail darter included development agen
cies and business interests that had no direct interest in the Lit
tle Tennessee River: the Edison Electric Institute, which was
concerned with endangered Florida manatees that might be
sucked into power generator facilities; the forest products indus
try, which feared a limitation in federal forest timber cuts owing
to endangered species; the Corps of Engineers; the Federal
Highway Administration; and so on. Beyond those who faced po
tential conflicts were far more, like the Pacific Legal Foundation,
for whom the darter served to fry bigger fish. The Tellico litiga
tion presented "environmentalism," which to many had come to
that humanity is somehow set apart and distinct from the natural world. The Scopes
trial, for example, demonstrated how harshly our Judeo-Christian culture responded to
any notion that the human species was but a mere evolution, another constituent ele
ment in a complex chain of ecological development. See Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105,
289 S.W. 363 (1927).
The Biblical story of Noah, however, also represents the concept that humanity's do
minion over nature is tempered by a duty of stewardship for future generations. When
God decided to cleanse the earth of its human degradation, he commanded Noah to take
with him aboard the ark a male and a female "of every kind of bird, of every kind of
animal, and of every kind of reptile ... so that their lives may be saved . . . [and they]
may propagate their kind over the whole earth." Genesis 6:19-21. In this respect, Noah's
story is "a symbol of the sanctity and uniqueness of every living species," S. Yaffee,
supra note 45, at 28, and Noah, like the species preservationists of today, faced the great
task of preserving the earth's natural heritage against the onslaught of human exploits.
See also Fellows of the Calvin Center for Christian Scholarship, Calvin College,
EARTHKEEPING: CHRISTIAN STEWARDSHIP OF NATURAL RESOURCES (1980).
67. Congress declared that "these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1982).
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represent a threatening intrusion of new, inconvenient public
values into their business, in a setting that could easily be char
acterized as ridiculous.
Tellico seemed to be the extreme case, showing how environ
mentalists cared more about wildlife and aesthetics than about
humans. Environmentalists were using an impractical, insignifi
cant environmental argument to threaten an important project
budgeted at millions of dollars. The snail darter spawned
thousands of cartoons, editorials, and deprecating cocktail con
versations, all emphasizing the potential imbalance represented
by "extreme environmentalists" poised against the forces of
progress.
In retrospect, the snail darter—or at least its carica
ture—served to hinder rather than help the citizens' efforts to
save the Little T habitat.68 For a while it even appeared that the
darter would function as a destructive two-and-one-half inch
wedge with which the anti-environmentalists would split apart
the Act.69 Nevertheless it can now be argued that endangered
species protections may actually have profited overall from the
Tellico Dam controversy.70 The shadow of the snail darter con
tinues to flicker behind a greatly expanded endangered species
regulation program, and the Act and its administration do not
appear to be suffering from that influence.
The Supreme Court decision presents an example of how the
snail darter strengthened the Act. Chief Justice Burger, who as
signed himself the opinion and made many caustic references to
the snail darter, nevertheless wrote a strong declaration of prin
ciple reinforcing the statutory purposes.71 The statute, he wrote,
represented a policy of "institutionalized caution" that Congress
68. The brouhaha surrounding the snail darter did not help the citizens in the Tellico
litigation.To the contrary, it helped the dam boosters' efforts to sidestep the dam's legal
and economic obstacles. It was the boosters who waved aloft the "silly" fish, while the
citizens tried to emphasize national economic common sense. The rhetoric of national
debate between public interest advocatesand the developmental establishment, however,
has continued to reflect the damaging caricature of environmental extremism.
69. In virtually every attack on the Act made in Congress, the snail darter was por
trayed as the epitome of environmental extremism, the example that demonstrated the
irrationality of inflexible endangered species protection. See Wagner, Endangered Spe
cies Law Threatens Federal Project; Amendments Contemplated, 35 Cong. Q. 453
(1977).
70. See Erdheim, The Wake of the Snail Darter: Insuring the Effectiveness of Sec
tion 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 9 Ecology L.Q. 629 (1981).
71. Burger's oral delivery was marked by a tone of sarcasm, inviting Congress to
amend the Act quickly. His tone during oral argument was studied in Cohen, Judicial
Predictability in United States Supreme Court Advocacy: An Analysis of the Oral Ar
gument in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 2 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 89, 123-24
(1978).
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had adopted for the nation in confronting the risk of extinc
tion.72 Faced with that irreversible threat, the Act established
the congressional principle that human actions should defer to
the threat. Extinction is forever.73 Burger did not hesitate to in
vite Congress to legislate an exception for the snail darter, but
his affirmation of the general principle was extraordinary.
After the Supreme Court case, public opinion, measured in a
continuing series of polls, has continued to show extraordinary
popular support for the concept of protection of endangered spe
cies.74 This popular support has translated to continued
reauthorizations for the Endangered Species Act, which must
periodically be renewed because of sunset provisions.75 The Act
has been targeted for attack by a series of business and develop
ment interests over the years, but virtually all amendments
passed since the snail darter case have strengthened the Act
rather than weakened it, providing funding for joint state-fed
eral protective actions,76 improving provisions for interagency
consultation and review in the case of potential conflicts,77 waiv-
72. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
73. Or, as one senator put it, "Extinction is quite literally a fate worse than death."
119 Cong. Rec. 25,670 (1973) (statement of Sen. Stevens) (quoting former Sen. Spong).
74. A 1980 survey indicated that a majority of Americans favored protecting wildlife
in general—even at the cost of foregoing additional jobs, housing, or other development
projects. Kennedy, Protecting Wildlife, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1980, at E23, col. 2. This, of
course, may not necessarily be true for the particular case of the snail darter, which is
still misunderstood as the little fish that blocked hundreds of millions of dollars of hy
droelectric power. Stephen Kellert of Yale University designed a survey based on the
Tellico scenario and measured public attitudes toward the confrontation between an ob
scure fish species and various development projects. As reported in a recent report from
the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy published by the University of Maryland,
"[T]he fish species won out handily over recreational projects, tied with projects to di
vert water for industrial development, but was soundly defeated by projects to produce
hydroelectric, agricultural, or drinking water improvements." Preserving Endangered
Species: Why Should We Care?, QQ—Rep. from Center for Phil. & Pub. Pol'y, Fall
1985, at 1, 1.
75. The congressional reauthorizations of the Act were Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat.
911 (1976); Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982). As this Article was going to press,
the 99th Congress adjourned without reauthorizing the Act, apparently due to legislative
"holds" imposed on the Senate bill, S. 725, by several western senators with particular
local concerns, like Senator Bentsen of Texas who feared that an endangered snake list
ing might block the Stacey Dam public works project. Annual appropriations have never
theless been passed into law providing for continued implementation of the statute,
which has been interpreted by the Administration as an annual reauthorization of the
Act itself. But cf. infra text accompanying note 143.
76. Pub. L. No. 95-212, 91 Stat. 1493 (1977) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1535(c) (1982)).
77. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752 (1978) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1536 (1982)).
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ing time delays for listing and other protections,78 and encourag
ing the implementation of recovery teams to target particular
species for special assistance.79
The major exception to this chronology of strengthening
amendments is the "God Committee" amendment added in
1978, which permits exemptions from the Act's protections.80
Originally, the Act embodied an absolute prohibition, but sec
tion 7 has been amended to permit species extinction. Because
preventing extinction was the purpose of the original Act, this
amendment can be viewed as a diminution in the protections
accorded to endangered species. Conversely, however, it can also
be argued that the "God Committee" procedure has actually
strengthened the Act. It introduces a note of flexibility, but that
flexibility is secured by a tough, high-level review process. Three
stringent tests must be applied before any species can be con
demned to eternal sleep: the proposed project must be regionally
or nationally important, there must be no reasonable or prudent
alternative to the project, and, perhaps most important, the
project's net benefits must be shown clearly to outweigh the
benefits of any alternative courses of action that would avoid in
jury to species or their habitat.81 These tests, especially the last,
established an unprecedented overall functional benefit-cost
analysis, including analysis of alternatives, as the basis of gov
ernmental resource decisionmaking. Given the track record of
experience under the Act to date—with virtually no irreconcila
ble conflicts between proposed projects and endangered spe
cies—it would appear that only rarely would such a test be nec
essary or successfully applied.82 There usually are alternative
78. Pub. L. No. 94-359, §§ 1, 3, 90 Stat. 911, 912 (1976) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1539(c) (1982)); Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 3, 93 Stat. 1225, 1225 (1979) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1982)).
79. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 11, 92 Stat. 3751, 3764 (1978) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1533 (1982)).
80. Id. § 3, 92 Stat, at 3752 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982)); see
supra note 29, infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompany
ing note 104.
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (1982). Note that this balancing test is not a balancing
of the value of the project against the value of the species at risk. Congress intended the
review to balance the net benefits of the project against the net benefits of alternative
courses of action, precisely the substantive balance that environmentalists typically,
though usually unsuccessfully, seek to implement. See H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 21-22, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 9453, 9472-73. Perhaps
not coincidentally, this balancing test was inserted by a senate legislative assistant who
had been a student at the University of Michigan and had taken a course in environmen
tal law taught through the efforts of the Michigan Environmental Law Society.
82. After exhaustive surveys of Department of the Interior files done by Wayne State
law students Mardi Hatcher and Deborah LaBelle, the Carter Administration was able
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locations, timings, designs, or methods, by which appropriate
benefits to the public can be obtained without destroying a spe
cies. If the "God Committee" votes to permit a project to con
tinue, it must also take all appropriate mitigation measures to
minimize the impact upon an endangered species.83
In light of the statute's political situation, it may well be said
that had the statute not received such a flexibility mechanism it
might have been repealed. Instead, section 7 has been secured in
an overtly stringent form. It is unlikely that any such blanket
restriction of federal projects would have been legislated ini
tially, given the original lack of congressional recognition of sec
tion 7's litigability. The "God Committee" procedure secures
section 7's protections, subject only to a review process so rigor
ous that no agencies have subsequently been willing to under
take the difficulties of advocating and obtaining an extinction
exemption.84 The net result is more than a pragmatic compro
mise. It leaves the United States with the strongest enforceable
legal provisions protecting endangered species against habitat
destruction that exist anywhere today.
As to statutory implementation, the Reagan Administration
has been less attentive to the terms of endangered species pro
tection than has Congress. Vice-President Bush initially made
the endangered species regulatory process a target of his an-
tiregulation committee.85 Subsequently, unable to convince Con
gress to back away from the terms of the Act, the Adminis
tration resorted to an administrative slowdown, drastically cur
tailing the rate at which new species were listed and species pro
tection programs funded in the field.86 Recently, however, imple-
to determine that of more than 4500 potential conflicts, only three had been administra
tively irreconcilable, and these (including Tellico) each represented cases in which the
agency refused to discuss project adjustments to alleviate the conflict. Senate Endan
gered Species Act Oversight Hearings, supra note 24, at 61, 63-64, 69-70.
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(B) (1982). The "God Committee" may grant an exemption
only if "it establishes such reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures, including,
but not limited to, live propagation, transplantation, and habitat acquisition and im
provement, as are necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the
agency action upon the endangered species, threatened species, or critical habitat con
cerned." Id.
84. No such exemptions have been issued since the Greyrocks decision at the time of
the Tellico review. See supra note 29.
85. Press Conference by Vice-President George Bush (Mar. 25, 1981) (regarding ac
tions taken by the President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief).
86. According to a source within the Department, Interior's enforcement of the En
dangered Species Act paralleled Secretary Watt's national parks policy: rather than do
anything new to expand protections, both focused efforts on "developing what already
existed." Many recovery plans for the protection and propagation of species were then
prepared by the Department although ultimately none were budgeted. The net result
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mentation has been improving.87
The courts since 1979 have been far more attentive to the
Act's requirements, and again perhaps the snail darter deserves
some credit. In case after case, courts have strictly interpreted
the Endangered Species Act to the detriment of powerful mar
ket forces. Oil well leases have been delayed,88 a major East
Coast refinery was scuttled in part because of endangered spe
cies problems,89 western water reclamation allocations have been
changed to favor species protection over industrial and munici
pal use,90 and the courts have written these opinions without ref
erence to the "significance" of the species concerned.91 How
strong would the courts have been in these cases had not the
Supreme Court held such a strong line in a highly publicized
case poising an "insignificant" species against a purported multi-
million dollar project? Judicial experience to date thus offers in
dications that future cases will be held to a high level of species
protection. The snail darter may be subject to continued dispar
agement, but its precedential position seems to have secured
protections to its comrades throughout the natural world.
D. Some Loose Ends in the Endangered Species Act
Three statutory issues still lie in wait. The first concerns en
dangered plants. Since the Endangered Species Act was first en
acted in 1973, endangered plant species have been treated differ-
was sharply decreased protective activity in the years following the change of
administrations,
87. See Defenders of Wildlife, Saving Endangered Species: Implementation of
the U.S. Endangered Species Act in 1984, at 1 (May 1985). The Defenders' review notes
that more species were listed and/or proposed in 1984 than in any year since 1979. Id. at
2.
88. Conservation Law Found, v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom.
Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983).
89. Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982).
90. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 1842 (1985).
91. There have, in fact, been a few encroachments on this strict rule, most notably by
the practice engaged in by a few courts of segmenting stages of a project's development,
allowing the environmental impact of the project to be assessed unit by unit. E.g., North
Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Lewis, 538
F. Supp. 149 (D. Hawaii 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Stop H-3 Ass'n v.
Dole, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 2344 (1985). Such segmenta
tion, of course, would smack of bad faith and raise the danger of the judiciary con
sciously setting up an exemption procedure to the Endangered Species Act. Comment,
The Effectiveness of Judicial Review Under the 1979 Amendment to the Endangered
Species Act, 7 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 145 (1986).
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ently from animal species. The original law gave limited
protection to plants. In the amendments to the Endangered Spe
cies Act, language has been added to extend protection to
plants.92 Endangered plants, however, currently lack some of the
most basic protections given to endangered animals,93 and plant
species have been less frequently listed as endangered or
threatened than animal species.94 As plant listings increase,
there is an increasing possibility of conflicts of "plants versus
progress."95
The second issue is the possibility that the Act's vague horta
tory provision for " carrying out programs for the conservation of
endangered species"96 may become a litigable requirement. In
Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Clark,91 for ex
ample, the court held that the Department of the Interior was
required not only to protect existing habitats and endangered
species, but also to "use programs administered by [the Depart
ment] to further the conservation purposes of [the Endangered
92. Such expansion of protection to plants was envisioned by the original framers of
the Endangered Species Act. S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1973
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2989, 2999.
The new language extending coverage to plants was added by Pub. L. No. 96-159, §§1,
3, 5, 93 Stat. 1225, 1225, 1228 (1979) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(a)(5),
1533(b)(7), 1537(b)(1), (3), 1537(c)(1) (1982)); Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 10, 92 Stat. 3751,
3762-63 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(2) (1982)).
93. Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1982), continues to
omit a blanket prohibition against the taking of endangered plants. Federal regulations
prohibit only the import or export of, removal and reduction to possession from an area
under federal jurisdiction of, interstate or foreign commerce in, and sale or offer for sale
of, endangered plants without a permit. 50 C.F.R. § 17.61 (1985). The only restriction by
either statute or regulation against taking endangered plants is the prohibition against
removal of such plants from areas under federal jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B);
50 C.F.R. § 17.61(c).
94. As of October 1, 1985, there had been 759 listings of animal species while there
had been only 116 listings of plant species. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11(h), 17.12(h) (1985). If one
only looks at the period of time that plants have been listed—since 1977—the figures are
166 animal species listings as opposed to 116 plant species listings. Id.
95. From the beginning, plants received slightly lesser protection; when originally
passed, the statute did not extend the taking prohibition to the taking of plant species.
In part this reflects that there were no plants listed as endangered at the time the origi
nal Act was passed. In larger part, according to people within the Department of the
Interior, the omission of plants reflected a probably incorrect gut reaction on the part of
many development-prone legislators that plants would be more difficult obstacles than
animals, which can get out of the way of the bulldozer. This leaves the statute with some
anomalies. For example, a bulldozer can smash an endangered plant with impunity, even
if known to be there, but a person who attempts to transplant the plant to save it from
the bulldozer could be prosecuted for moving it without a permit. Despite this lack of
statutory protection, however, plants have recently received increasing attention within
the Office of Endangered Species.
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1982).
97. 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 1842 (1985).
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Species Act]."98 That is, the Department must "conserve
threatened and endangered species to the extent that they are
no longer threatened"99 and "halt and reverse the trend toward
species extinction, whatever the cost."100
The third latent issue is potentially even more far-reaching. It
is the species "taking" issue.101 Section 7 clearly prohibits only
federal agencies from jeopardizing the existence of a species or
modifying its critical habitat.102 But if section 9's statutory pro
hibition against "taking" is interpreted to include conscious dis
ruption—bulldozing, killing, displacing—of animal species, or
destruction of their habitat, then the prohibitions of the statute
can reach out to private actors as well. Thus, developers plan
ning to fill a mangrove swamp containing an eagle's nest to build
a condominium project might find their enterprise halted by a
conflict with the Endangered Species Act, enforced by the strin
gencies of civil and criminal penalties or an injunction. The defi
nition of "taking" in the regulations permits this interpretation.
The term "harm" and the definition of "take" state that such
acts "may include significant habitat modification or degrada
tion," and extend beyond acts that result in the killing of endan
gered wildlife to acts that alter endangered species' breeding,
feeding, or sheltering patterns.103 The focus of the issue will be
upon the Secretary's exercise of the statutory authority to per
mit such "incidental takings," and judicial review thereof.104
Given the widespread destruction of habitat that accompanies
the day-by-day development of land and water resources in
America, this provision may come to be the Act's next cause
celebre. Where unpermitted takings occur or are threatened, the
potential for citizen suits reinforces the Department's enforce
ment of the Act.106
98. Id. at 261.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 262 (emphasis in original) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)).
101. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)-(b), 1532(19) (1982); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1985).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
103. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1985).
104. The 1982 amendments added a provision allowing the Secretary of the Interior
to issue permits for "incidental takings" under § 9 upon approval of a conservation plan
if the taking "will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of
the species in the wild." 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (1982) (emphasis added).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982). Under this section, "any person may commence a
civil suit on his own behalf... to enjoin any person ... or agency . . . who is alleged to
be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority
thereof." Id. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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In sum, the Endangered Species Act has flourished in the
years since the Supreme Court decision in TVA v. Hill.10* The
snail darter may not have fared well in the congressional pro
cess, but the general principles of endangered species protection
have received a degree of attention and reinforcement that
seems surprising in light of the array of market and political
forces arrayed against them. As with NEPA, it may well be that
the judicial and media attention directed to an inadvertent pro
vision of environmental law may have resulted in making the
basic statute and the principles for which it stands far more sub
stantial as legal and political entities, even something of a
"motherhood" issue. Endangered species protection seems likely
to be with us for a long time.
II. Legal Controversies in the Wake of the Snail Darter
Throughout the snail darter litigation, as so often in environ
mental cases, the basic issues litigated were more questions of
general legal doctrine than of particular environmental principle.
The case presented three major legal issues. First and most im
portant, it presented the question whether an equity court faced
with a statutory violation must demand statutory compliance.
Second, it presented the statutory interpretation question of ret
roactivity, questioning whether a restrictive statute applies to a
previously commenced project. Third, it tested allegations of im
plied repeal, arguments that the appropriation of funds for an
otherwise illegal agency project impliedly exempts the project
from the statutory provisions it violates. Less directly, it raised
several interesting ancillary doctrinal issues about eminent do
main, the award of attorney fees in public lawsuits, and statu
tory interpretation.
A. Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion
Questions about equity jurisdiction are increasingly important
issues for lawyers and courts, and environmental cases often
provide the battleground for equity doctrine. Tellico raised anew
the question of whether, in the face of a proven statutory viola
tion, a court retains equitable discretion to deny an injunction so
as to permit the violation to continue. In other words, does a
106. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
&V
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court always retain its traditional power to "balance the equi
ties" on all questions arising in the equity jurisdiction?107
1. TVA v. Hill— The Supreme Court's Tellico opinion had to
address this question squarely, though it had been briefed in
only one paragraph of the citizens' brief to the Court and in an
antagonistic amicus curiae motion.108 In the oral argument, the
Justices were wrestling with the difficult question of whether a
statute had to be applied literally when it contained a clear pro
hibition, despite the fact that the alleged common sense of the
case seemingly supported the challenged dam rather than the
protected fish. Throughout the oral argument, the Justices
raised the question whether the Court had to apply a statute
even if it produced an "absurd" result. The TVA and Attorney
General Griffin Bell who argued the case, asserted that a court
must always retain the right to deny an equitable remedy.109
p The citizens, on the other hand, argued that separation of
powers prevents courts from, in effect, repealing or amending
J statutes unilaterally. In the case of nonstatutory causes of ac-
/ tion, an equity court can certainly determine whether it will al
low a particular action to continue. The citizens argued, how
ever, that once a legislature has made a statutory pro
nouncement on point, courts must abide by it. The citizens thus
made the "conservative" argument that courts should not be ac
tivist but rather should follow the dictates of the words of the
statutes before them. The citizens argued that their purpose in
seeking court enforcement of the Endangered Species Act was to
accomplish a "remand to the legislature." Adopting an argument
of Professor Sax, they argued that judicial enforcement of statu
tory prohibitions was a proper practical leverage for public in
terest litigants to bring direct legislative and administrative at
tention to problems at hand.110 If the courts did their job,
citizens who are so often excluded from official decisionmaking
could use statutes as leverage to obtain a hearing on important
issues of public policy. If, on the other hand, courts were permit
ted to "legislate" exceptions to statutory prohibitions as they
saw fit by denying statutory enforcement, citizens would be de-
I
107. This question spawned further research that led to an article, Plater, Statutory
Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 524 (1982).
108. Brief for the Respondents at 45 n.40, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see Pa
cific Legal Found., Motion for Leave to Argue as Amicus Curiae at 1-3, Hill.
109. Cohen, supra note 71, at 108-09.
110. Brief for the Respondents at 44, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). "[T]he role of
the courts is not to make public policy, but to help assure that public policy is made by
the appropriate entity . . . ." J. Sax, Defending the Environment 151 (1971).
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nied one more opportunity to bring such public issues into the
political arena. If, after a judicial decision to enforce the law, a
legislature ultimately decided to override a statutory prohibition
as it applied to a particular project, at least that ultimate deci
sion might have been made on the merits after an opportunity
for discussion of issues previously shielded from the official pub
lic eye.
The Supreme Court, in a ringing declaration of the separation
of powers argument, declared that courts had no discretion to
intrude what might well be their own ideas of common sense
upon the clear, contrary language of the Endangered Species
Act. Chief Justice Burger, who must have felt somewhat discom
fited finding himself allied with the small fish, wrote an opinion
that declared courts' subservience to the written words of stat
utes. In a dramatic final comment, showing why courts could not
ignore the law of the land, he quoted Bolt's A Man for All
Seasons:
The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's
right. And I'll stick to what's legal. ... I'm not God. The
currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find
such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But
in the thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester. . . .
What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to
get after the Devil? . . . And when the last law was down,
and the Devil turned round on you—where would you
hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? . . . This country's
planted thick with laws from coast to coast—Man's laws,
not God's—and if you cut them down . . . d'you really
think you could stand upright in the winds that would
blow then? . . . Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for
my own safety's sake.111
Coupled with prior precedents, it appeared that the Burger
Court had adopted a firm position on the ascendancy of statutes
over some courts' inclination to mold law as they saw fit.112 The
Court soon departed from this high ground, however. The subse
quent case, Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,113 was the story of
111. R. Bolt, A Man For All Seasons 65-66 (1962), quoted in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 195 (1978).
112. Chief Justice Burger had recognized the point during oral argument in Hill, re
sponding to citation of his own opinion in Rondeau v. Mosinee PaperCorp., 422 U.S. 49
(1975), in which he made the operative distinction between discretion as to remedy and
nondiscretion as to substantive prohibition. See Plater, supra note 107, at 555 n.119.
113. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
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an endangered island rather than an endangered fish.
2. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo— The Governor of Puerto
Rico, joined by fishermen, environmentalists, and other disaf
fected citizens, attempted to halt the United States Navy's prac
tice bombing on and around the inhabited island of Vieques.
The Navy's actions threatened the safety and peace of several
hundred people living close to the area where bombs were drop
ping every day. In this case, as with the snail darter, the citizen
plaintiffs were desperately seeking a legal "handle" by which
they could halt the government's action or negotiate a compro
mise. Absent some statutory authority, it was clear they would
lose. Political pressure and public petitions had proved useless
in obtaining concessions from the Defense Department. But the
Governor and the citizens found several relevant statutory pro
visions, the most direct, paradoxically, a violation of the Clean
Water Act.114 According to the clear statutory provisions and
legislative history of the Act, Congress had made it illegal to
dump munitions into the waters of the United States without a
permit.116 To make it even clearer that this provision of the Act
applied to the military, the statute included a waiver provision
for cases of military necessity—the President could issue an ex
ecutive administrative exemption to permit particular activity to
continue.116 In the circumstances, the citizens thought that they
would at the least get an opinion from the Supreme Court re
quiring the President to issue such a waiver; this would have
forced the President to acknowledge their problem publicly, and
perhaps stimulate negotiations.117
By the time the Puerto Ricans argued in the Supreme Court,
the snail darter's equity argument had been further devel-
114. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
115. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1362(6).
116. Id. § 1323(a). The intent that the Executive, not the courts, was to utilize this
flexibility mechanism is demonstrated by the presidential exemption's lack of a require
ment of particular findings of fact, a decisive grant of power. President Reagan, however,
may have wished to pass the job on to the courts to avoid having to spend the political
capital that such an exemption might require. Accordingly, an injunction would have
forced the President to take into account the merits of the case in determining whether
to issue the politically sensitive exemption. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
117. Absent a waiver, the statute was clear: the dumping of munitions was illegal
unless the Navy obtained a permit, and the permit process was sufficiently difficult that
it was doubtful that the Navy could have obtained one. The permit process required
certification by the affected state, or in this case, Puerto Rico. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
Because the Governor of Puerto Rico and residents of the island had instigated the suit,
it was unlikely that Puerto Rico would certify the permit application to allow the Navy
to continue the bombing.
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oped.118 How could the Court square a strict requirement for ju
dicial enforcement of statutes with a hundred years of jurispru
dence applying the traditional equity balance? The citizens'
argument to the Court asserted that the traditional "balance of
equities" actually had always been three separate balances: first,
a threshold balance to determine whether a plaintiff could pro
ceed, involving questions of laches, clean hands, etc.; second, a
balance as to whether particular conduct would be allowed or
abated, as in the classic Ducktown Copper case,119 in which the
court determined that a copper smelter could continue even
though it was killing neighboring farms; and third, once the de
cision was made to abate an activity, a balance to determine
which equitable remedy was best suited to effectuate that deci
sion.120 The citizens argued that the passage of a statute by a
legislature replaced only the second inquiry, leaving the court to
balance threshold issues and to tailor remedies.
The declaration of what is and is not prohibited is, however,
the core function of a legislature, once it has chosen to act. It is
not a correlative power of the courts in such circumstances. No
case was found in which any court had ever overruled a statute
in this middle balance of equities. In common law cases, absent
statutes, courts continued to decide what was and what was not
prohibited. But where statutory violations were concerned, the
scope of equitable balancing was restricted to the threshold
questions, of laches, clean hands, etc., and to the question of
choice of remedy to effectuate the substantive decision on abate
ment, the third balance. The citizens argued that, as in Hecht
Co. v. Bowles,121 the leading case, courts remained free to deny
injunctions or modify injunctions as necessary so long as they
accomplished whatever the statute required or prohibited. The
second balance, however, was preempted by statute.
In Hecht, the Supreme Court had made a much-quoted decla
ration of a court's continuing power to balance the equities when
confronted with a petition for an injunction.122 But in that case,
118. The Tellico litigation had led to the further analysis in Plater, supra note 107.
The author sent drafts of the Berkeley article to both parties; the law review sent galley
proofs to the Court as the only piece of legal scholarship on point. Counsel for Puerto
Rico made this updated Tellico argument the cornerstone of their brief and oral
argument.
119. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658
(1904).
120. See Plater, supra note 107, at 543-45.
121. 321 U.S. 321 (1944) (involving violations of maximum price regulations issued
under the wartime Emergency Price Control Act of 1942).
122. Id. at 329-30. Backed by "several hundred years of history," the Court declared:
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it had been established that the defendant would no longer vio
late the statutory price-fixing prohibition.123 In Hecht, the Court
recognized that the legislative mandate, the second area of the
common law's traditional equitable balancing, was not at issue
because the legislature's wish was being strictly accommodated.
Thus, the balance of equities language was addressed only to the
question of whether a full injunction was necessary, and the
Court decided it was not. In both Tellico and Romero-Barcelo,
the citizens would have been delighted if the defendants would
voluntarily have complied with statutory requirements absent
an injunction. In both cases, however, government agencies took
the recalcitrant position that they would not comply with the
law unless a court forced them to do so. In such circumstances,
the citizens argued, the courts' discretion had to be exercised to
achieve compliance with the law.
The Puerto Ricans' argument stressed the dangers to separa
tion of powers if activist courts could override legislative pro
nouncements; in the circumstances, they understandably ex
pected that the Court would apply the statute as written,
especially because the statute provided for the flexibility of a
presidential waiver. The expectations of the citizens, and schol
ars and analysts watching the case, were derailed when the Su
preme Court, in an eight to one opinion, bypassed the equity
analysis.124 The Court declared, citing Hecht, that equitable ju
risdiction meant that courts could always balance a question,
even in the case of specific statutory prohibitions.125 The Court
thus asserted that judges could override statutory violations
when, in the exercise of their discretionary judgment, they con
sidered the statute unwise as applied to a particular case. This
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexi
bility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practi
cality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing pri
vate claims.
123. The Hecht Company had reimbursed all the customers who had been
overcharged. For sales for which the overcharged customer could not be identified, the
money was donated to charity. The Hecht Company had also changed inventory prac
tices to prevent future violations. Thus, the Hecht Company had not only made out
standing efforts to correct the harm done by past violations, it had also done everything
in its power to prevent future violations.
124. See Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunc
tions, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 513 (1984); Petruzzi & Thomas, Equitable Discretion Under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 11 Ecology
L.Q. 73, 80-81 (1983).
125. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313.
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is, needless to say, an extremely "activist" stance, indicating
that judicial passivism was less a conservative principle with the
majority than a pragmatic basis for reaching organic team
decisions.
But the Court had to deal with the snail darter. The majority
declared that the Tellico case had been special, one of those rare
cases in which Congress had legislated a clear, decisive protec
tion and intended it to be stringent. This reasoning was espe
cially bemusing because most commentators would agree that
Congress had no idea of what it was doing when it initially
passed section 7.126 The Court asserted a presumption that stat
utes implicitly included a recognition of the judiciary's power to
override violations in the interest of a traditional balancing of
equities. Only when a statute clearly abjured such judicial power
would a court be restricted in its rewriting of legislation. This
holding in Romero-Barcelo amounts to a declaration that Con
gress, when passing a regulatory statute, must say: (1) "it is
hereby prohibited to do A, B, and C" and (2) "we really mean
it!"127
In lonely dissent, Justice Stevens tracked the citizens' argu
ment in detail, recognizing that the majority was overlooking
some very important organic issues reaching beyond the ques
tion of equitable jurisdiction per se. The majority's decision, he
argued, was "premised on a gross misunderstanding of the statu
tory scheme" of the Clean Water Act and lacked the "profound
respect for the law and the proper allocation of lawmaking re
sponsibilities in our Government" reflected in the TVA v. Hill
opinion.128
Where does the argument on equitable discretion stand to
day? The matter is not clear, perhaps because the argument is
fairly sophisticated. Some courts cite the Romero-Barcelo prece-
126. House and Senate Reports do not make it clear that § 7 could be the basis of
injunction litigation. On the floor of Congress only one speech seems to have indicated
that there might be enforcement repercussions resulting from the Act. In reference to the
threat to the whooping crane from Air Force bombing practice, Congressman Dingell
emphasized the mandatory nature of § 7: "Under existing law, the Secretary of Defense
has some discretion as to whether or not he will take the necessary action to see that this
threat disappears . . . [, but] once the bill is enacted, he or any subsequent Secretary of
Defense would be required to take the proper steps." 119 Cong. Rec. 42,913 (1973) (em
phasis added).
127. See 456 U.S. at 314-15. It would seem wiser and more in harmony with the
constitutional separation of powers, with separate roles for legislatures and courts, to
have the opposite presumption: that a statute should be deemed to bind a court unless
Congress has inserted language indicating that courts may decline to enforce the statute
when a balance of the equities so militates.
128. Id. at 333-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dent and continue to follow Tellico.129 Others cite Tellico for the
wrong proposition,130 or cite both Tellico and Romero-Barcelo
approvingly, thinking that they are consistent.131 The Supreme
Court has subsequently echoed its reasoning in the Tellico
case,132 so that, at the highest level, it appears that the matter
continues to be unresolved. The path of the snail darter on this
issue will continue to be visited by the courts, for ours is a soci
ety in which statutory regulations at federal, state, and local
levels continue to play a broad role, and injunctions are increas
ingly a favored rather than an extraordinary remedy of adminis
trative law. The need to enforce statutes by injunction recurs
constantly in our legal system, and important questions of sepa
ration of powers and activist courts ride in the balance.
B. Retroactivity
From the beginning of the snail darter case, when the federal
judge in Tennessee declined to apply the endangered species
129. See, e.g., Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 430
(1st Cir. 1985) (indicating that in the context of antitrust laws, a court must use its
discretion to pick a remedy that will enforce the antitrust laws); Manatee County v.
Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 778, 794 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (indicating that a court should not issue
an injunction for statutory violations if the violations have ended).
One recent case virtually ignored Romero-Barcelo and held that an injunction is re
quired in the case of a NEPA violation except in a "rare circumstance" in which the
refusal of the injunction is necessary to protect the environment. Save Our Ecosystems v.
Clark, 747 F.2d 1240,1250 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d
1414, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985) (injunction appropriate remedy for substantive violation of
environmental statute), cert, granted sub nom. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 106 S. Ct.
2274 (1986).
130. See, e.g., Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 314 n.l (9th Cir. 1982) (citing
TVA v. Hill for the principle of equitable balancing on the merits).
131. See, e.g., Conservation Comm'n v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984).
132. In County of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985), the
Supreme Court observed that equitable discretion should not be used to contradict the
intent of federal policy as stated in statutes. Id. at 1257 n.16. In Oneida, the Oneida
Indian Nation sued for damages for the occupation and use of land that had been im
properly conveyed by their ancestors in a 1795 treaty in violation of the Trade and Inter
course Act of 1793. The Oneida Nation claimed that the conveyance was void because of
the statutory violation and claimed damages on common law and statutory grounds. The
defendants, two counties in New York, argued that the Oneida Nation's claims should be
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated:
"[T]he statutory restraint on alienation of Indian tribal land adopted by the
Nonintercourse Act of 1793 is still the law. .. . [This] suggests that. .. the application of
laches would appear to be inconsistent with established federal policy." Id. (citation
omitted). In dissent, Justice Stevens, while arguing that laches could be used to bar the
common law claim, recognized that the Court should be cautious in using equitable doc
trines in ways that risk frustrating the will of the legislature. Id. at 1266.
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statute to the Tellico project,133 there was a legal question of
whether statutes apply to projects commenced before their effec
tive date. In the Tellico case, the dam structure itself had been
built in 1968, two years prior to NEPA and five years prior to
the passage of the Endangered Species Act. The TVA, of course,
argued that the statute did not apply, in the same way that it
had argued in 1971 that NEPA did not apply to the ongoing
project.134
The "retroactivity" argument, in general terms, is familiar to
most American lawyers. It is clear as a matter of both constitu
tional and natural law that a person cannot be punished for do
ing something that was not illegal at the time the act was com
mitted.135 In administrative law, however, this "ex post facto"
argument is twice wrong. First, it is a principle generally appli
cable to criminal, not civil, prohibitions. Second, it typically is
considered a right of individuals, not some sort of inherent right
of governmental agencies to pursue their activities unhindered
by subsequent laws. Governmental agencies are regularly held to
new restrictions in effect at the date of decision, on the theory
that government is a servant of the populace.136
These distinctions did not deter the TVA, which argued,
through the Attorney General, that the statute should be read to
include an implied retroactivity provision immunizing ongoing
projects from applicable federal law. The argument failed. Years
of NEPA holdings had established that federal agencies could
not claim an implied retroactivity immunity for ongoing
projects, some sort of bureaucratic vested rights.137 Additionally,
the Court noted that it was future action, the proposed im
poundment of the river, that would accomplish the entire evil
the statute had been written to prevent. Thus, the statute was
not being given retroactive application, but prospective
enforcement.
Moreover, as a matter of statutory construction, the citizens
argued that "retroactivity" is a misnomer. Given the direct, fa
cial meaning of the statute, they asserted, the question was
rather whether the statute should be read to include some sort
133. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir.
1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
134. EDF v. TVA (I), 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir.
1972).
135. See generally R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
136. See Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1969).
137. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert,
denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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of implied "grandfather" clause immunizing ongoing projects. A
statute stands on the four corners of its text, they argued. If it
does not include a waiver for grandfathered projects, it should
be read as it stands.138
Subsequently the courts have followed TVA v. Hill on this
point. The courts have indicated that when substantial action
remains to be taken, raising questions under a statute, the stat
ute must be applied even though the project predated it.139
C. Implied Repeals in Legislation by Appropriation
As a further twist on statutory construction, the TVA argued
that regulatory statutes can be repealed by implication when ap
propriations are passed by Congress for projects that violate the
law.
The underlying political reality was that the House Appropri
ations Committee, vested with jurisdiction over the pork barrel,
regularly pushes forward on funding and construction for the
projects that give the Committee its extraordinary power, re
gardless of statutory or policy considerations that stand in the
way.140 In the case of the Tellico Dam, the House Appropriations
Committee had steadfastly refused to review economic and prac
tical criticism of the project over the years, not to mention the
"abstract" arguments made by environmentalists.141 Accord
ingly, the House Appropriations Committee continued to pro
vide funds for the project, continued to provide a forum for the
TVA to trumpet the supposed absurdity of complying with the
Endangered Species Act, and continued to include delicate
phrases urging completion of the project within their annual ap-
138. Congress knows well how to insert grandfather clauses when it wants to and
indeed has done so elsewhere in the Endangered Species Act. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(b)(1) (1982).
139. See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 730 F.2d
579 (10th Cir. 1984).
140. The incestuous relationship between pork-barrel agencies and the pork-barrel
House and Senate Appropriations Committees is a crucial focus in this and many other
public interest controversies; it raises an array of intriguing lines of inquiry too extensive
to'cover here.
141. Every economic argument had been raised before the House Appropriations
Committee over the years by citizens' witnesses. However, nowhere in the legislative his
tory is there the slightest indication that the Committee ever took economic, not to men
tion environmental, considerations into account.
The text refers to the Appropriations Committee as a singular entity. There is, of
course, a counterpart in the Senate but, because of convention, all spending measures
begin in the House and consequently that chamber exercises the predominant role in the
politics of the appropriations process.
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propriations reports.142
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees, however,
constitute a different kind of legislative process from congres
sional action in the substantive committees. They are designed
to be funding committees, not substantive lawmakers. Because
the power of the purse is great, Appropriations Committee mem
bers may not serve on other committees, and appropriations
bills in the House and Senate are not permitted to include
amendments changing provisions of substantive law.143 That is
supposed to be the province of the regular committees of Con
gress that sit in judgment over the various statutory projects
and programs. In reality, however, it is the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees that day-in and day-out, year-by-
year, review all actions of the federal government. By shaping
appropriations, they have accrued immense power in shaping
the implementation of statutes.
The Supreme Court's snail darter decision declared the funda
mental principle that repeals by implication are disfavored; ap
propriations will not be considered to repeal a statute just be
cause money has been given for an otherwise prohibited act. The
Court said, "To find a repeal of the Endangered Species Act
under these circumstances would surely do violence to the 'car
dinal rule . . . that repeals by implication are not favored.' "144
Accordingly, the snail darter produced Supreme Court precedent
requiring that the constitutional lawmaking function be chan
neled through the explicit legislative process of Article I.
Ironically, as we have seen, the pork barrel was able to evade
this judicial precedent in Tellico's subsequent chapter by sneak-
142. Although the relevant appropriations acts did not expressly mention Tellico,
committee reports contained language that urged completion of the dam so that its
"benefits [could be] realized in the public interest, the Endangered Species Act notwith
standing." S. Rep. No. 301, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1977).
143. See, e.g., Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XXI, cl. 2, H.R. Doc. No.
277, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 564 (1985); Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XVI, cl. 4,
S. Doc. No. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1984). House Rule XXI, cl. 2 sets formal
requirements for appropriations bills, including the clause, "No amendment to a general
appropriation bill shall be in order if changing existing law." Senate Rule XVI is to
similar effect. Over the years, the power of the purse has led to such concentrations of
parliamentary power that Congress has sometimes burdened the committees with special
restrictions. At times Congress has eliminated the appropriations committee altogether.
The extraordinary power and effect of the appropriations committees, surviving even
after the 1974 Budget Act, deserves a major chronicle. For a partial introduction, see
W. Ashworth, Pork Barreling (1981); T. Reid, Congressional Odyssey: The Saga of a
Senate Bill (1980).
144. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978). In support of this proposition, the Court
cited Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974) (quoting Posadas v. National City
Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
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ing an explicit rider onto the appropriations bill directly requir
ing that the project be finished immediately and repealing provi
sions of law to the contrary.146 Although this rider was a
violation of both House and Senate rules, no point of order was
made to enforce the rules because the amendment was never
read out loud.146 Under the pressure of the pork-barrel process,
President Carter subsequently caved in and the House Appro
priations Committee once more was able to assert its hegemony
over public works.147
On the issue of implied repeal by an appropriations bill, the
snail darter thus won a court battle, but ultimately lost the par
liamentary war. When the appropriations process comes under
scrutiny, as it does from time to time, the track of the snail
darter perhaps may again be traced in public consideration of
the process.
D. Further Notes: Condemnation and the Arbitrary and
Capricious Test, Attorney Fees, and Statutory Construction
Beyond the legal issues directly litigated in TVA v. Hill lie
several other interesting issues in the areas of eminent domain
condemnation, attorney fees, and a further statutory interpreta
tion point.
1. Condemnation— Eminent domain is a drastic form of the
police power that is little studied beyond the questions of defin
ing "public use" and assessing just compensation. But Tellico
raises a more interesting question: Why is it that condemnees
cannot realistically attack a government agency's condemnation
actions on the merits, as in this case in which they can demon
strate that the project's purported purposes—recreation and in
dustrialization—are not rationally served by the particular tak
ing? This line of inquiry leads to a reconsideration of ap
plications of the arbitrary and capricious test.
It appears to be constitutionally, as well as statutorily, re-
145. See supra note 32.
146. Unless a point of order is made immediately, it is gone forever unless the full
chamber can be persuaded to reconsider. Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule
XXI, cl. 2, H.R. Doc. No. 277, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 835 (1985) (noting that the rule only
permits a point of order to be made and thus does not expressly provide for subsequent
reconsideration when no point of order is raised).
147. See supra note 33. In a subsequent telephone call with the citizens' representa
tive, the President mournfully noted that the House Appropriations Subcommittee
chairman would likely force the provision down the President's throat, a stance that
demonstrated how incapable President Carter felt in controlling debate on his own do
mestic policies. Telephone conversation with President Carter (Sept. 25, 1979).
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quired that government decisions shown to be irrational be de
clared null and void.148 Courts, however, strenuously try to avoid
judicial review of the merits of decisions to exercise eminent do
main. Thus, in Tellico the farmers were not able to obtain mean
ingful review of the TVA's condemnation, which could have re
solved many questions associated with the project a dozen years
before the snail darter controversy.149 Further, even when courts
review for arbitrary and capricious action, the terms of that in
quiry are not clearly understood. The arbitrary and capricious
test is widely but not well known. The Tellico setting stimulated
further analysis leading to the conclusion, reported elsewhere,150
that in substantive terms, at least, arbitrariness comes down to
the question of whether a rational government agency could ra
tionally have made a particular decision. This conclusion has
three facets: (1) there must be a reason, a standard, or a measur
able purpose against which the action can be reviewed; (2) the
means must factually serve that purpose; and (3) some consider
ation of proportionality is involved, where less drastic means
and alternatives would avoid major net burdens on individu
als.161 Tellico thus opened up the difficult question of the limits
of governmental power as applied to private property, a basic
issue of democratic governance and another example of turned
tables, as the purported "liberals" of environmentalism may
often actually represent Burkian conservative values.152
148. The arbitrary and capricious test is explicitly legislated in the federal Adminis
trative Procedure Act and many of its state corollaries, but its existence must be more
than a statutory creation because courts had used the standard in judicial review of ad
ministrative action (and legislative enactment) long before the test was explicitly codi
fied. Examination of the test in its applications over time reinforces the conviction that
the arbitrary and capricious test is constitutional, reflecting a fundamental concept of
procedural and substantive due process. See Plater & Norine, Substantive Rationality
Review of Government Decisions: An Exploration of the Arbitrary and Capricious Test
Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain (Mar. 1986 draft).
149. An undetermined number of farm families attempted to resist the condemnation
suits in a series of unreported cases before Judge Robert Love Taylor, the U.S. District
Court judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee. These attempts were unsuccessful,
like the similar later case, United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Tracts of Land, 387
F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 532 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S.
827 (1976).
150. The analysis is developed further in a forthcoming article, Plater & Norine,
supra note 148.
151. These three basic substantive inquiries in judicial review of regulatory actions
were explored in a takings article, Plater, The Takings Test in a Natural Setting: Flood-
lines and the Police Power, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 201, 224-28 (1974).
152. The citizens emphasized rational cost accounting while the conservatives, led by
Howard Baker, obscured the economic merits of the controversy by characterizing the
debate as little fish versus big dam, a portrait of environmental extremism. See supra
note 68.
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2. Attorney fees— As to attorney and expert witness fees, it is
a fact of life that public interest litigants typically fulfill an im
portant societal role at their own expense.163 The expenses of
public interest cases can be immense. Their factual and legal is
sues are typically complex, novel, challenging, and often unpop
ular. In these circumstances, the legal system has made some
small gestures toward accommodating citizen enforcement of
statutes. Though the Burger Court has acted decisively to pre
vent fee-shifting by federal courts sitting in equity,164 state
courts are able to award attorney and expert witness fees to citi
zens acting as private attorneys-general,166 and Congress has
specifically authorized such fee-shifting in more than five dozen
statutes including the Endangered Species Act.166
The TVA resisted the Tellico plaintiffs' application for fees
under the Act's citizen enforcement provisions. As in many pub
lic interest fee cases, the Tellico citizens had to make their peti
tion to the same judge who had initially dismissed their case and
who was less than happy to have been reversed;167 they filed af
ter the case had come to an end rather than during active litiga
tion;168 they requested fees although their efforts had ultimately
been mooted by congressional action; and they claimed fees for
the efforts of attorneys and experts who were otherwise em-
153. Damages usually cannot be claimed and injunctions are generally the remedy of
choice. Furthermore, no profits result to the litigants for their successful efforts because,
unlike most civil litigation, no commercial or property interests are being defended. See
King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation,
41 Tenn. L. Rev. 27 (1973).
154. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (restricting
equitable fee-shifting, in the absence of statute, to cases of bad faith and "common
fund" awards).
155. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (apply
ing the English rule), aff'd sub nom. Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 652 P.2d 985, 186
Cal. Rptr. 754 (1982).
156. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1982).
157. Especially when the decision is to be made by a district judge whose prior deci
sion on the merits was successfully overturned by plaintiffs, the discretion to award or
deny attorney fees raises serious questions and has been generally circumscribed by a
presumption in favor of awards. See, e.g., Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ, 412 U.S.
427 (1973) (per curiam); Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1977); Natural Re
sources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
158. Litigators often hold back their fee claims until the case has ended, understand
ably fearing that the claim might affect the decision on the merits. See Sprague v.
Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939) (lower court authorized to award fees for appel
late work although fee question not litigated on appeal); Universal Amusement Co. v.
Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980); Souza v. South-
worth, 564 F.2d 609, 613 (1st Cir. 1977) (indicating preference for postappellate fee liti
gation). On the presumption favoring a grant of fees, see Newman v. Piggie Park Enters.,
390 U.S. 400 (1968), and its progeny. Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dicta for strictness in granting fee-shifting against government).
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ployed as university professors. Despite the district court's deci
sion,169 which on these grounds rejected the fee claims, and
those for the author's work in particular, on the eve of the Sixth
Circuit appeal in an unreported consent settlement,160 the TVA
agreed to pay the plaintiffs' fees and costs. The author's fees
were then donated to a national river conservation fund.161
3. Statutory extremism— A final note on "extremism" in stat
utory interpretation: At many stages during the course of the
litigation, and in the halls of Congress and the agencies, it was
argued that statutes should not be applied if they would lead to
what the particular observer considered an "absurd result." As
Justice Powell said,
In my view § 7 cannot reasonably be interpreted as ap
plying to a project that is completed or substantially
completed when its threat to an endangered species is
discovered. Nor can I believe that Congress could have
intended this Act to produce the "absurd result"—in the
words of the District Court—of this case.162
The snail darter opinion in the Supreme Court, however, em
phasized the dangers of such an approach. Paralleling its argu
ment on whether or not judges have equitable discretion to en
force their own ideas of common sense, the Supreme Court said
that even when a statute led to what a court might think was an
absurd result, if the facts fit the law, the statute was to be ap
plied as it was written.163 Other decisions have echoed that hold-
159. Hill v. TVA, 84 F.R.D. 226 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
160. Hill v. TVA, No. 79-1465 (6th Cir. May 12, 1981) (consent order dismissing
appeal).
161. Contributions are welcome to the Little Tennessee River Memorial River Con
servation Fund, managed by National Trout Unlimited, Inc., 501 Church Street, N.E.,
Vienna, Va. 22180.
162. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 196 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Justice Powell continued:
If it were clear from the language of the Act and its legislative history that Con
gress intended to authorize this result, this Court would be compelled to enforce
it. It is not our province to rectify policy or political judgments by the Legisla
tive Branch, however egregiously they may disserve the public interest. But
where the statutory language and legislative history, as in this case, need not be
construed to reach such a result, I view it as the duty of this Court to adopt a
permissible construction that accords with some modicum of common sense and
the public weal.
Id.
163. Id. at 194-95. In a recent case arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor
rupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. II 1984), the Su
preme Court echoed this approach of applying a statute as it was written even in the face
of apparently contrary legislative intent. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275
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ing.164 The snail darter therefore continues to be a small juris
prudential extreme, serving as a litmus test for the proper role
of courts, agencies, and Congress in our legal system.
III. The Snail Darter as Messenger: Rationalizing the
System
In the course of the Supreme Court argument in TVA v. Hill,
Justice Powell leaned over the bench and wondered what snail
darters were good for, anyway: "[Are] they . . . suitable for
bait?"165 Then, as often through the course of the controversy,
the river defenders tried to explain how the little fish was linked
to the public merits of the endangered valley. The snail darter
was "a canary in a coal mine." In and of itself, it might have
little importance except to those few who could appreciate its
natural aesthetic. Yet like the canaries that were carried into the
coal mines of old to warn human beings of the dangers of meth
ane gas, the little snail darter was a sensitive species that, by its
endangerment in the Little T Valley, acted as an indicator of
endangered human values as well. The citizens repeatedly at
tempted to make their audience see that the snail darter was
only the tip of its pyramid, the indicator of a far more complex
resource controversy in the Little Tennessee Valley.
The little snail darter was a barometer of far more than its
endangered valley. It also served to register how our society
makes important decisions. It is from this perspective on how
the American governmental system responded to the merits of a
(1985). In Sedima, the Court held that a plaintiff need not establish a "racketeering
injury" in order to maintain a private civil action under RICO despite the Court's recog
nition that such a literal reading of the statute contributed to the evolution of RICO
"into something quite different from the original conception of the enactors." Id. at 3287.
For the courts to read a "racketeering injury" requirement into the statute would be a
"form of statutory amendment [not] appropriately undertaken by the courts." Id. Jus
tice Powell again dissented.
164. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982) (statutory formula
awarded $23,670.40 in damages to discharged employee for employer's refusal to pay
$412.50 in wages); United States v. M/V Big Sam, 693 F.2d 451, 454-56 (5th Cir. 1982)
(statute was inconsistent in limiting liability of dischargers and nondischarging third
parties in oil spills by allowing greater liability of nondischarging third parties), cert,
denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
165. Cohen, supra note 71, at 104. The judiciary was not the only branch of govern
ment that failed to recognize endangered species as "barometers" or indicators of larger
human values. On July 31, 1978, Representative David Bowen (D.-Miss.) introduced a
bill to add an economic assessment that focused only on the disruptions that species
protection might create to the procedure for listing species as threatened or endangered.
H.R. 13,658, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). No action was ever taken on the bill.
Summer 1986] Snail Darter as Paradigm 849
narrow, dramatic, discrete case, involving complexity of fact, val
ues, law, and economics, that the snail darter may have its major
lessons to teach. And because there is such a mismatch in the
snail darter case between reality and common sense on the one
hand, and the general perception and ultimate resolution of the
issue on the other, the snail darter offers a sobering warning
about the long-term needs for improvement in the way our soci
ety makes decisions.
A. Simplification in a Complex World
The snail darter case represents a superb example of a recur
ring phenomenon in modern American government: in a world of
increasing complexity, in which government plays a comprehen
sive and increasingly diverse range of roles, the rhetoric of na
tional discourse often seems to become simpler rather than more
complex when faced with difficult questions.
The snail darter case was complex. It involved a range of eco
nomic projections, social and natural as well as fiscal costs, and
alternatives, that guaranteed that any rational decision would
have to be a careful balance of complex factors.
Now consider the rhetoric that dominated the snail darter
case. It was called the most extreme environmental case of the
1970,s. Walter Cronkite referred to it as "a classic conflict be
tween energy and environment . . . , the little fish against the
massive Tellico Dam."166 The image of the little fish poised
against the big dam was the media's basic rhetorical framework
from the beginning of the litigation until the end—six years of
intense governmental consideration reduced to a chronic and ul
timately misleading caricature.167 This caricature was destruc
tive, for it became the governing cliche. By reducing an impor
tant and complex debate to a mindlessly simple juxtaposition,
the cliche ultimately eclipsed the merits built so carefully by the
river's citizen defenders over twenty years, and allowed the dam
boosters to prevail, spelling the death knell of a river that had
166. CBS Morning News: Endangered Species (five-part CBS television broadcast,
Mar. 29, 1982 to Apr. 2, 1982).
167. The media's photographic coverage reflected the caricature precisely. By far the
most common newspaper photo showed an inset of the little fish with a measuring scale
of two-and-a-half inches beside a shot of the dam photographed with a wide angle lens so
as to make the dam look immense in comparison (little fish, big dam). See, e.g., Ayres,
Controversy Over 3-Inch Fish Stalls the Mighty TV.A., N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1977, at
31, col. 1. The fish was undeniably small, but the dam, too, was a pipsqueak among TVA
dams not to mention western dams. But the catchy cliche was not to be denied.
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flowed for two hundred million years.
Why was the case caricatured in such simplistic terms? Was it
inevitable? It was not for lack of citizen effort to inform the me
dia.168 Having used the darter as a necessary "handle," the citi
zens tried desperately over the years to show what was attached
to it. In part, the answer must be that the caricature was a con
venient rhetorical device for those who did not wish to have the
decision turn on the merits. For years the opponents of environ
mentalism had been arguing that "the pendulum of environmen
tal protection has swung too far," arguing that environmental
J \ values are a necessary trade-off to economic growth. This case
was too good to let pass, as an object lesson in extreme environ
mentalism. The forces of development that had been increas
ingly hampered by growing public consciousness of the costs of
their activities—in terms of public health, disruption of air qual
ity, water quality, and so forth—had long attempted to attach a
stigma to environmentalism generally, a stigma of elitism, a
stigma of illegitimacy, a stigma that would in any event prevent
the legitimation of these outside public values being intruded
into their ongoing work. The snail darter seemed to personify all
of those illegitimate claims being made against the business and
development community by the outsiders, the environmen
talists.
One puzzling feature of our modern society is that, in the na
tion that has developed the most sophisticated information sys
tem ever known to human society, public debate can be charac
terized by such a superficial level of information coverage,
reportage by quips and aphorisms. Starting from the presidency,
and continuing through Congress, the newspapers, the AP wire,
the evening news, and the conversations of Everyman on the
street, the country may be less sophisticated in its public deci
sionmaking discourse than in hindsight it was, say, a century
ago, in the 1850's in public discussion of slavery, or in the 1890's
in discussions of monopoly systems, or in the 1930's in discus
sions of economic revival.169 If a case as narrow in subject as this
§ S
\y
168. One bumper sticker, included in the press packets distributed by the citizens,
read: "Snail Darter ... It's More Than a Little Fish!" See also infra note 184 and accom
panying text.
169. The Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858, which were masterpieces of logic and sub
stantive argument as well as rhetoric, were attended by thousands and displayed and
analyzed on the pages of newspapers all over the nation. See generally Created Equal?:
The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858 (P. Angle ed. 1958).
These debates over slavery and union, industrialization and rural virtue, give some
credibility to the idealized images of American towns, each with its newspaper, its Athe
naeum Theatre and library, its respect, aspirations, and attribution of value for intelli-
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one can nevertheless involve so many important and different
considerations, it would appear that our society runs serious
risks making decisions according to simple aphorisms because an
aphorism is only as good as the analysis that preceded it. It
rarely has the stuff of wisdom in and of itself.
B. How Decisions Are Made
Tellico also demonstrated a decisive and instructive difference
between the way environmental analysts make a decision and
the way most development decisions are made in our society.
The snail darter case raises the question of whether our official
decisionmaking system should adopt some of the overview per
spectives of environmental analysis.
How are rational decisions made? In approaching any particu
lar controversy, it makes sense to look at the primary deci
sionmakers. If a factory is going to be built in a particular place
using a particular process, if a particular chemical product is go
ing to be put onto the national market, if a particular forest is
gent political discourse. Today we may know far more than they, but the automobile and
television have eroded such 19th-century aspirations. As modern cars roll down our com
mercial strips their radios give news headlines for 60 seconds on the hour as a grudging
concession to the ongoing activities of human society.
Illustrative of the lack of sophistication found in contemporary political discourse is
the following excerpt from a 1976 radio program entitled, "Snail Darter" (transcript on
file with U. Mich. J.L. Ref.). The commentator is Ronald Reagan.
For those of you who haven't heard of or who only dimly remember hearing
something about the "Snail Darter", let me offer an explanation.
The "Snail Darter" is a minnow. Now that may not be biologically accurate,
but to everyone but a biologist a tiny fish two or three inches long is a minnow.
There are 77 or so varieties of Darters with 77 or so names and the differences
between them are indistinguishable to everyone but a student of Ichthyology.
What makes the Snail Darter unique among its cousins is that it is [on] the
endangered species list, lives only (so far as we know) in a 17 mile stretch of the
Little Tennessee river and has held up a $116 million dam for four years. It is
interesting to note that in this hassle it is a bureaucratic civil war—the Environ
mental Protection Agency versus the Tennessee Valley Authority. T.V.A. was
building the dam.
The thing that brought the "Snail Darter" (I still say it's a minnow) back into
the news was a recent action by the House Appropriations [Committee]. With an
eye toward settling the dispute and getting the Tellico dam completed, the Com
mittee appropriated $9 million to transplant the fish, which they estimate num
ber 10,000.
It only takes a little arithmetic to figure out that comes to $900 per fish. Think
about that the next time you use minnows for bait.
These words need only be read by even the most undiscerning observer to demonstrate
that the distance between our current President's commentary and those embodied in
the Lincoln-Douglas debate is more than merely temporal.
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going to be logged or river be dammed, the same kind of deci
sionmaking matrix occurs: the persons who will make the deci
sion weigh the benefits, costs, and alternatives involved in their
particular proposal. As the economists who distinguish between
internal and external costs have noted, however, the promoters
typically weigh these rational considerations only as they affect
themselves.170 Thus, in deciding to release a particular chemical
on the market, the decisionmaker weighs the benefits in terms of
profit and corporate recognition against the costs in terms of
production, distribution, and associated liabilities, to determine
whether there is a net benefit to him or herself.171 Implicitly,
every decisionmaker also considers the options available. One
such alternative is always the alternative of doing nothing.
Others include variations in product, process, timing, and the
like.
The genesis of environmental problems is that typically this
benefit-cost-alternatives analysis is designed to be rational in
the decisionmaker's own terms, but pays no attention to the
broader real life consequences to society. If one were to view the
decisionmaking as a ledger, decisionmakers typically only con
sider costs, benefits, and alternatives above the line that sepa
rates themselves from the rest of their society. Below the line
are a wide range of nonaccountable costs, benefits, and alterna
tives that should be considered in an overall rational societal de
cision but are extraneous to the actual decisionmakers. If a
chemical is likely to cause cumulation in the bodies of persons
who are exposed to it, that cost will be recognized by deci
sionmakers "above the line" only insofar as there is liability or
accountability for whatever negatives can be clearly proved to
originate from the chemical.172 In the building of a factory, bene
fits and burdens likewise exist below the line as well as above;
the benefits of employment are felt not only by the official deci
sionmaker, but also by the persons who are part of that payroll.
Similarly, the costs to society of polluted air—lower quality of
life, health problems from water and solid waste disposal—are
not part of the decisionmakers' terms of accountability, unless
there is some extraordinary market accountability, such as tort
170. See generally J. Galbraith, Economics, Peace, and Laughter (1971); G. Har
din, Exploring New Ethics for Survival 71-76 (1972); Breslaw, Economics and Ecosys
tems, in The Environmental Handbook (G. DeBell ed. 1970).
171. See supra note 170.
172. Tort law is thus a primary "rationalizer" of the marketplace, though the ac
counting may be only coincidentally proportional to the costs externalized. See Note,
The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 383 (1969).
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liability and consumer boycotts, or artificially imposed govern
mental restraints.173
Overall it is likely that, thanks to the genius of the American
enterprise system, the internal and external ledgers are not simi
lar. American entrepreneurs, private and public alike,174 measure
their successes by the number of benefits they can capture
within their accounting, and the number of costs they can avoid.
The invisible hand may generate a trickle-down of both profits
and costs, but it is far more democratic about distributing the
latter than the former.
Environmentalists have represented an extraordinary new
force within our society because they typically attempt to recog
nize the real costs to a society that are sufficiently long-range,
indirect, or difficult to prove—or in any event outside the eco
nomic accounting realm of the decisionmakers—that they would
be otherwise ignored. Environmentalists, in other words, cannot
173. "Good public relations" may allow a corporation to write off nonobligatory costs.
A business^ ultimate duty, however, is owed to its shareholders and in many indus
tries—especially where products are components not marketed directly to consum
ers—"good public relations" cannot justify expenditures unrelated to the direct costs of
production and distribution.
174. The extent to which government decisionmaking has come to share the func
tional frame of reference of private corporate entrepreneurs is remarkable. In the classic
18th-century economic model that still informs modern American business, private en
trepreneurs are expected to look out for their own profits alone. Their managerial re
sponsibility to their stockholders is to develop and implement projects that will provide
maximum gain with minimum outlay; negative burdens like pollution will be passed on
to the public at large if this can be done without facing accountability in lawsuits or
otherwise. Ultimately, the wistful moral premise of those who still hold this theory is
that their vigorous private self-aggrandizement will trickle down to serve the greater
good. To talk about the indirect or noneconomic consequences of corporate deci
sions—like America's multibillion dollar task of cleaning up dumped hazardous wastes,
or the health and wildlife consequences thereof—is regarded as radical, or at least impo
lite, insofar as it threatens the basic moral premise.
Government officials, particularly in the public works agencies, often voice a similar
wistful self-justification. Their "production" is measured in tons of concrete poured, or
miles of roadway built, or miles of waterway drained, dug, or dammed. Their "profit" is
measured in terms of jobs gained for themselves and their contractors, federal dollars
gained by their agencies from the public purse, dollars passed through to their local pub
lic works constituency, and political capital at federal, state, and local levels produced by
the foregoing. To the members of both the corporation and the agency, the survival and
perpetuation of the organization is a basic loyalty and a compelling managerial responsi
bility. Survival of both, moreover, is thought to depend upon maintaining the flow of
direct "profits," not some nebulous concept of indirect new benefit accounting or vague
public good. Thus, many promotional projects in both sectors are "paid" for by trading
off human or natural resources that do not have to be accounted for because they are
unmeasurable, and therefore "free." To the promoters, whether private or public, ac
counting for consequential negative externalities is dysfunctional, hence to be avoided.
Rather, each private or public entrepreneur seeks to do his mission, hoping perhaps that
self-interest might eventually equal public interest.
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afford to be extreme, simplistic, or unbalanced and expect to be
effective within the governing system. When the attempt is
made to intrude new values or new recognitions of social costs
into an ongoing system, the case must be made as carefully and
realistically as possible in rational, overall terms. Environmen
talists thus often ask, as in Tellico: "What is the real scope of
benefits to the public overall? What are the real costs to the
public overall? What alternatives would overall best serve soci
ety?" This is a very different series of questions from those that
official decisionmakers pose. By intruding an overall accounting
into the decisional balance, environmentalists have threatened
the heart of our nation's development system, the presumption
that the trickle-down theory works rationally. Environmentalists
begin with the proposition that no one, no thing, is an island,
that everything is connected to everything else, and that there
fore no rational system can allow its decisions to be made by
those whose self-interest does not take account of negative con
sequences throughout the system.
C. Decisionmaking in the Tellico Case
From this overview perspective, let us consider the decision
making of the promoters and the environmentalists in the Tel
lico case.
The TVA asserted that the Tellico project would achieve the
benefits of (1) increased recreation, (2) shoreland development
through resale of private land condemned for the project, and
(3) measurable but less significant benefits in water supply, flood
control, navigation, and augmented power flows.175 Those bene
fits appeared in the official benefit-cost analysis. The TVA's esti
mated costs comprised the costs of condemning the lands for the
project, labor, and building small dam structures at various
places in the valley. The alternatives officially considered by the
Authority were in the nature of small dams, or slightly altered
dams, or doing nothing, which the Authority's environmental
impact statement declined to take seriously because it would
forego all of the claimed benefits of the project.176 The environ
mentalists, looking at these allegations, went through a classic
environmental analysis: they challenged the benefits by demon
strating that recreation would be deflated rather than en-
175. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
176. 1 Office of Health & Envtl. Scl, TVA, Environmental Statement, Tellico
Project 1-44 (1972).
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couraged by the creation of just one more reservoir and the elim
ination of a unique river; they argued that shoreland benefits
attributable to a reservoir were unlikely ever to accrue and
showed the insignificant nature of the other dam-associated ben
efits claimed for the project. As to costs, the environmentalists
insisted that one could not make a rational decision on the val
ley's fate without valuing the loss of farmland, tourist potential,
irreplaceable historic and archaeological sites, fish and wildlife,
and the value of a healthy farming community, as costs that the
people and their valley would bear. Moreover, as "environmen
talists," they discussed alternatives that would be more profita
ble to society as a whole: the no-dam alternative, proposing a
river-based development with encouragement of family agricul
ture alongside enhanced recreation on the flowing river, tourist
development along a "Cherokee Trail" through the valley to the
national park upstream, and historic and archaeological parks
along the river.177
In retrospect, the extraordinary feature of the prolonged
course of official decisionmaking for the Little Tennessee River
is the difference in accuracy between the projections made by
the Authority and those of its citizen critics. No economists
outside the TVA were ever found who thought the project would
be worthwhile built as designed with a dam and reservoir.178
Subsequent history has shown that the environmentalists were
correct. The reservoir has not stimulated reservoir-based indus
try to locate in the valley,179 and the losses in terms of resources
and opportunities foregone have been incalculable. The system
was faced with a decision in which the promoters of the project
were consistently inaccurate in their assertions, and in which the
environmentalists were consistently accurate both in economic
assertions and in their other arguments about development of
the valley. The environmentalists, in other words, not only had
law on their side, but also economic common sense and the fac
tual analysis of what was at stake. They also had media cover
age—more, according to one analyst, than for any other environ
mental issue of the 1970's except, perhaps, the Alaska land
177. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
178. Cf. authorities cited supra note 38 (comparing profitability of the project with
the river development option).
179. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
180. Based upon his press coverage analyses, Professor Ron Rollet, who held a joint
appointment in the Schools of Journalism and Natural Resources at the University of
Michigan, repeatedly asserted that the snail darter case received more media coverage
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Nevertheless, the American legal system was able to overturn
the rational arguments of the environmentalists and push
through the project, which, according to the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, Charles Schultz, on the eve of its
completion still didn't pay if "one takes just the cost of finishing
it against the [total project] benefits."181 How could this be?
One important lesson of the snail darter controversy is that
the purported benefit-costs accounting of official decisionmaking
may not reflect the actual factors motivating the official actors,
the insiders who make things happen. The TVA, for instance,
justified the Tellico project in terms of recreation, shoreland de
velopment, and other associated benefits, in the face of evidence
that these would not occur. This is an indication that the Au
thority's actual benefit-cost analysis lay in a different realm alto
gether. The project's true benefit to the TVA was in some large
part its status as an ongoing project, with all the attendant po
litical and institutional advantages that implies. This indicates
the possibility that development agencies may not be motivated
primarily by a desire to produce particular discrete benefits, but
rather to keep busy. The true value to the Authority, as with
most pork-barrel projects perhaps, was that it represented an
opportunity to build a project. An agency lives by doing things.
In doing things, it builds up clientele, political momentum,
budget, political IOU's, and provides an ongoing livelihood for
all who comprise it. In the case of Tellico, moreover, it now
seems apparent that the project symbolized a rebirth of a devel
opment mission for the TVA and its chairman Red Wagner, a
strategically important opportunity to rescue the Authority from
stagnation as its initial construction mission had come to an end.
Tellico not only satisfied the Authority's political clientele but
also helped to resurrect sagging organization morale.182 These
motivations are powerful, but not the kinds of benefits an
agency can openly avow.
It surely is no surprise to hear that agency programs take on a
than any other single environmental controversy in the decade 1970-1980. Conversations
with Professor Ron Rollet (Oct. 1979).
181. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, supra note 31, at 26.
182. These observations, and many to follow, obviously draw upon the author's re
flections on the contorted political history of Tellico found in Plater, supra note 3, at
747-87.
A masterful and massive recent historical analysis of the TVA's campaign to promote
the Tellico dam concludes that the Authority was impelled to build the project by the
institutional hope that it would start up a new era of regional development construction
projects, irrespective of its shaky cost justifications. W. Wheeler & M. McDonald, TVA
and the Tellico Dam 1936-1979 (1986).
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life of their own. An agency is like a rolling stone: it gathers mo
mentum. Projects are the life blood of a pork-barrel agency.
Similarly, those individuals outside the TVA who supported the
agency project through thick and thin against the force of fact
and law and rational argument must have considered that their
interests were similarly served. One cannot understand the Tel
lico project's story without understanding the p^ijleMml^aspi-
rations of Howard Baker, the midlife crisis of the TVA orj[aniza-
tion. the lmSagiTofTennessee politicians toJhe^Vl^'^e local
real estate industry in EasTTennessee, orjhe concern£of|abor
inHEKe^afie^^^ projects on which to
wSflTTlius, as irTmany other public projects, the purported
prSject purposes may be mere( window^ project pro
moter^ For them, a public works prqjScTrepresents an impor
tant opportunity, and a river valley appears as a cost-free re
source that can support it. 3a^0 * Prober*-*
Faced with this Janus problem, the environmentalists had to
argue on two levels. First, they had to argue against the pur
ported benefit-cost analysis, indicating that the official reasons
for the project didn't make sense. Second, in an exercise of Real-
politik, they had to tryjto circumventJhe fildd^^TeasmmJoOJ1^
project WithfrT the TVA they discreetly sought the support of
those who were concerned with statutory compliance, motivated
by the public-interest purposes of the Authority, and less con
cerned with the demands of the TVA's institutional momentum.
Outside the Authority the citizens tried to show that local eco
nomic interests were better served without the dam than with it;
and they tried to raise the political costs, in terms of political
pressure and media criticism, for the politicians who so strongly
supported the dam. Essentially, the environmentalists were jan-
successful iniJJheir secoi^^eal^ is a pow
erful, unspoken assumption among most oFthe constituency of a
pork-barrel project, even though these proponents may not be
lieve their own official estimates of project profitability, that the
federal dollars imported into a region through appropriations
are the best politically available way to obtain local economic
subsidies. The implicit self-condescension of those constituen
cies is difficult to overcome, especially when no official agency
mechanism exists or is willing to undertake the various possible
projects for alternative development.183
183. This institutional constraint is a consistent skew in the balance. One analyst
discovered this with an airport NEPA process that showed low-cost alternatives to new
runways. The Agency, however, was incapable of implementing the economically prefera-
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There is much to support the hypothesis that environmental
ists, in addressing the purported merits of various projects and
attempting to provide rational refutation and suggested alterna
tives, basically miss the promoters' real point of view. The Tel
lico Dam's boosters had no great interest in the real merits of
the project's benefit-cost justifications or the requirements of
the law. Many apparently knew from the start that Timberlake
City was a chimera. Rather, they had made institutional or per
sonal calculations that the dam fit their own varying needs in
terms of institutional momentum, political power, budgeting, or
local land speculation, better than any citizen-initiated alterna
tive would. So the promoters—the TVA leadership (at least up
to the reform leadership of President Carter's appointee, David
Freeman), Howard Baker, who never wavered in his behind-the-
scenes efforts to build the dam regardless of economic or legal
obstacles, the congressional pork-barrel committees, the local
politicians and land speculators who now seem to have achieved
the control over Tellico lands they had long desired—all pushed
the project to its conclusion for their own ends, quite immune to
persuasion on the public merits.
D. The Courts and the Media
This variance between official actors' purported and actual
goals is not a novel assertion, and the citizens were certainly not
surprised to encounter it. But the snail darter litigants at
tempted to circumvent the paradox of official decisionmaking
through another calculated risk. They presumed that if the deci
sion was left to the normal official track, the merits would never
shape the outcome. By ft°ing to court. anr| to the media, however,
the citizens hoped to beafelft..tQ hold the_^i^es^stgin^to deci-
sionj^^ political marketplacenmay be the
daily reaHtiTol^^ but when an issue is brought into
the courtroom or into the fickle eye of media coverage, the terms
of dialogue change. No longer can TVA officials say, as they
would privately, "We are pushing ahead because (veteran TVA
ble alternatives. See Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 Okla. L. Rev. 239
(1973).
Professor Bruce Hannon of the University of Illinois Center for Advanced Computa
tion has demonstrated how pork-barrel dollars could be far more valuably invested in
health care, transportation, and education, but implementation is institutionally and po
litically impossible. See Hannon & Bezdek, Job Impact of Alternatives to Corps of Engi
neers Projects, 99 Engineering Issues 521 (1973).
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chairman) Red Wagner doesn't like the idea of this agency get
ting a black eye; we have never been stopped by the public and
we won't start now." Instead, they now must try to justify the
project in an open forum on objective facts. Once the media un
dertakes intensive coverage of an issue, a congressperson no
longer can say, "I will vote against the river because Howard
Baker wants the dam." Rather, the decision shifts to a pur
ported social good model: "I will vote against the river because
the people need thousands of jobs that will result." As_ajju§s-
tion is elevatedJ&JLhe public or judicial eye, the promoters' posi-
tipn mav not change, but the rhetoric must. And here the citi
zens finally have a forum that may make the decisionmaking
process address the merits.
A judge is paid to listen and decide on a case's merits. The «
media too, ifjt gets into the merits and stayajdflL.them, cari^kr^
police government decisions. Both come under intense pressure
not to do so, of course. Courts are reluctant to oppose official
decisionmaking, hence the typical deference to agency discre
tion, the rock-hard presumption of statutory validity, and the
feeble judicial constraint upon official actions embodied by the
arbitrary and capricious test. The media^J^jLits part, is to an
extent an entertainment industry. News programs pro\^e"nm^
fotainment"; accordingly, it is ofte^i^jUtJ^pi^yjde intensive^,
news coygrage of stories that arlTcbmplicated or less dramaticLor
"depressing" stories thajjJLlustjna^
of official dec^ionn^kmj;^ the sysfem^does
notjv$«H&^l^^ a drgmaSc target or
punfihj^ne^ The temptationjis to cover Things superficially if
they involve stoiieiTEar^e deemeHH^
oil boring. ~ ~ ~-~~~-~~~-~~~~~
Rational arguments by public interest advocates nevertheless
can occasionally be effective because official decisionixmkeis^CK
respond on the merits when forced tojakxoui^ji^^
They respond to courts, perhaps, because courts are still re
garded in our society as not openly political. One cannot argue
politics to a judge overtly. For the good of all, participants try to
hold to the presumption that courts will resist the pull of power
politics and adhere to principle. Accordingly, judicial decisions
often are able to stake out positions that are not merely reflec
tions of ongoing political reality.
WhjLiofiS-Jthejned^ effect? Perhaps because even in
Washington, a city ofJnsideriTwho realize^Eat mosTTGn^^ns
do not know-JRore than a tiny"part"oTTJie flow~of infojmatiojn
and important decisions 3eBiffe3jp^
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talj^there is a healthy regard for public opinion when it gets
awakened, focused, and mobilized. Watergate is a vivid memory:
a"Tresideiil WttlTMpefH"controrbf the Washington machinery
was brought low by a news story that got out to the grass roots,
a story that was comprehensible, was covered in depth over
time, and ultimately made the decision on the merits an obvious
conclusion.
The citizens who brought the snail darter lawsuit surmised
that the first wave of media coverage would focus on the silly
little fish stopping the big dam. But theaJbruated that overtime
the story would havejto be expiated in^moredepth byreporters;
tKenveTi^^ knew that at every level and turn, the mer-
*ta-*C]^^ rather
than that of the official decisionmakers. Over the^yeajrslhey
talEea^^itirmore than 140 reporters.184 To the end, hogeKerJbhe
national media neverjance-xavergd theTellicostorv in its real
t^mTiBSc^^ .The dam continued to be a"mas-
siv^*TT50^00^0^ dam" held up only by the little
snail darter.
And the Little Tennessee River did not make it. The courts
that, perhaps against their instincts, had held to the law and
applied it in the endangered species litigation, dropped the ball
in overtime. Wheji^hewI2hjej*>k^
tional riiafttnjLtnpf.hp Adding of the ..valley in SEJfiL!^
tory[l>ver^^ ^P~
neered, the Sixth Cjj&yyUuXtecUn the
first amendment argument through a _series_j)f_ gyrations
designed W
preme Couffweiit along.185 Shortly thereafter the dam's gates
184. The author's logbooks alone list 147 reporters contacted.
185. The Cherokees mounted a constitutional case based upon their first amendment
right to free exercise of religion; Chota, the site of their most holy cultural place, would
be destroyed. Led by two traditional medicine men descended from Sequoyah, the Cher
okees filed suit to enforce religious rights that had been specifically recognized in the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). See Affidavit of Am-
moneta Sequoyah (Oct. 11, 1979), Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979)
(translation of original affidavit written in Cherokee) (available at Tellico Archives, Bos
ton College Law School):
I am a Cherokee Medicine Man as my father was a medicine man and my
grandfather was a medicine man.
I still go back to Chota and to the River for my medicine. . . .
... If the water covers Chota and the other sacred places of the Cherokee
along the River, I will lose my knowledge of medicine.
If the lands are flooded, . . . the strength and power of the Cherokee will be
destroyed.
I can not live without practicing medicine, because it is what I live for.
Judge Taylor dismissed the suit on the ground that in order to exercise first amend
ment religious rights one must own the land on which they are asserted. Sequoyah, 480
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were closed and Nell McCalPs house was bulldozed on the eve
ning news, showing America, for the first time, that there was
more to Tellico than a little fish.
Retrospect
The overall systemic conclusions that one can draw by looking
back at this one story must be measured. They certainly, how
ever, are sobering for those who have trusted that law and fact
and logic have a compelling force within our governmental sys
tem that will inevitably be served when a case is clear on the
merits, no matter what the special interests arrayed against it.
Readers may draw their own conclusions from the narrative, a
process with which the citizen participants also continue to
wrestle, seeking to harvest something useful.
Perhaps the best way to sum up the Tellico story is that only
in America could citizens so lacking in money and political
power have taken such a dauntingly complex issue through the
legal system to the level of a national debate. And more sober-
*ngty> perhaps only in America could a nationally important case
once having been so developed in fact, law, economic^flT}fj^^- ^
mon sense, havel)^^ of me-
dia caricature. It is not practical for observers ofmiode^
interest citizen litigation to put their trust only in the legal sys
tem, though that can carry far. The fabric of our society's deci
sionmaking clearly involves preponderant forces in the political
process, and also jlrather ham-handecLbut potentially critical
force represented by the mediaiuJcailLnational information sys
tem. One would hope thatjgjhe pressures of society grow more ^
complexTtheTfespo^ information systemTa^ otpC
the courtsTwHIH^ more complex^apierf.
than incriasing^simplistic. ~~—*---~~ ——-—
Pluralistic democracy—viewed here as an openness of the offi
cial decisionmaking system to the rational arguments of citizen
"outsiders"—emerges from this narrative not as just a nice idea
or catchy epigram but as a societal strategy that is critically im-
F. Supp. at 612. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was understandably wary of Judge Taylor's
rationale but nonetheless refused relief on the ground that Chota was not central to the
Cherokee religion, a test that had not been addressed at oral argument. Sequoyah v.
TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). Ammoneta Sequoyah
and his brother, who was also a traditional medicine man, both died the year after the
Valley was flooded, on August 22 and January 25, 1981, respectively.
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portant for coping with the extraordinary complexities of our
natural, economic, political, social, and planetary circumstances.
The governing system—law, politics, media—that allowed the
Little Tennessee River to die for no goocT reason must learn the
dangers of a narrowed field of view and insulated official deci
sionmaking for the long-run prospects of our collective national
endeavor.
Otherwise, as a New York Times editorial once put it, refer
ring to the Appropriation Committee's sleight of hand that fi
nessed so many years of the citizens' work and permitted the
dam to be completed, "This sort of thing endangers more than
fish."186 ~ ~—«—
186. Looking Down, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1979, at A22, col. 2.
